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Journal Article
Misplaced divides?: Discussing political disagreement with strangers can be unexpectedly positive
Psychological Science
Kristina Wald, Michael Kardas, Nicholas Epley
2024
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Citation
Wald, K. A., Kardas, M., & Epley, N. (2024). Misplaced Divides? Discussing Political Disagreement With Strangers Can Be Unexpectedly Positive. Psychological Science, 35(5), 471-488. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976241230005
Abstract
Differences of opinion between people are common in everyday life, but discussing those differences openly in conversation may be unnecessarily rare. We report three experiments (N = 1,264 U.S.-based adults) demonstrating that people’s interest in discussing important but potentially divisive topics is guided by their expectations about how positively the conversation will unfold, leaving them more interested in having a conversation with someone who agrees versus disagrees with them. People’s expectations about their conversations, however, were systematically miscalibrated such that people underestimated how positive these conversations would be—especially in cases of disagreement. Miscalibrated expectations stemmed from underestimating the degree of common ground that would emerge in conversation and from failing to appreciate the power of social forces in conversation that create social connection. Misunderstanding the outcomes of conversation could lead people to avoid discussing disagreements more often, creating a misplaced barrier to learning, social connection, free inquiry, and free expression.
Journal Article
Surprisingly Good Talk: Misunderstanding Others Creates a Barrier to Constructive Confrontation
Journal of Experimental Psychology
Dungan, James A. and Epley, Nicholas
2024
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Citation
Dungan, J. A., & Epley, N. (2024). Surprisingly good talk: Misunderstanding others creates a barrier to constructive confrontation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Advance online publication.
Abstract
Open communication is important for maintaining relationships when conflicts inevitably arise. Nevertheless, people may avoid constructive confrontation to the extent that they expect others to respond negatively. In experiments involving recalled (Experiment 1), imagined (Experiment 2), simulated (Experiment 3), and actual confrontations (Experiments 4a and 4b), we find that people’s expectations are systematically miscalibrated such that they overestimate how negatively others respond to confrontation. These overly negative expectations stem, at least in part, from biased attention to potentially negative outcomes of a constructive confrontation (Experiment 5), and from failing to recognize the power of relationship-maintenance processes that are activated in direct conversations (Experiment 6). Underestimating how positively relationship partners will respond to an open, direct, and honest conversation about relationship concerns may create a misplaced barrier to confronting issues when they arise in relationships, thereby keeping people from confronting issues that would strengthen their relationships.
Journal Article
Let it go: How exaggerating the reputational costs of revealing negative information encourages secrecy in relationships
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Michael Kardas, Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2023
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Citation
Kardas, M., Kumar, A., & Epley, N. (in press). Let it go: How exaggerating the reputational costs of revealing negative information encourages secrecy in relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. (PrePrint).
Abstract
Keeping negative interpersonal secrets can diminish wellbeing, yet people nevertheless keep negative information secret from friends, family, and loved ones to protect their own reputations. Twelve experiments suggest these reputational concerns are systematically miscalibrated, creating a misplaced barrier to honesty in relationships. In hypothetical scenarios (Experiments 1, S1, & S2), laboratory experiments (Experiments 2 & 6), and field settings (Experiments 3 & 4), those who imagined revealing, or who actually revealed, negative information they were keeping secret expected to be judged significantly more harshly than recipients expected to judge, or actually judged, them. We theorized that revealers’ pessimistic expectations stem not only from the cognitive accessibility of negative information (Experiment S3), but also from a perspective gap such that the negative outcomes of disclosing this information, compared to positive outcomes, are more accessible for prospective revealers than for recipients. Consistent with this mechanism, revealers’ expectations were better calibrated when directed to focus on positive thoughts, or when they considered revealing positive information (Experiments 5, 6, & S4). Revealers’ miscalibrated expectations matter because they can guide decisions about whether to reveal information or conceal it as a secret (Experiment S5). As predicted, calibrating revealers’ expectations increased their willingness to reveal negative information to others (Experiment 7), suggesting that miscalibrated fears of others’ judgment create a misplaced barrier to honesty in relationships. Overestimating the reputational costs of disclosing negative information might leave people carrying a heavier burden of secrecy than would be optimal for their own wellbeing.
Journal Article
Undervaluing the positive impact of kindness starts early
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Margaret Echelbarger, Nicholas Epley
2023
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Citation
Echelbarger, M., & Epley, N. (2023). Undervaluing the positive impact of kindness starts early. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152 (10), 2989-2994.
Abstract
Prosociality can create social connections that increase well-being among both givers and recipients, yet concerns about how another person might respond can make people reluctant to act prosocially. Existing research suggests these concerns may be miscalibrated such that people underestimate the positive impact their prosociality will have on recipients. Understanding when miscalibrated expectations emerge in development is critical for understanding when misplaced cognitive barriers might discourage social engagement, and for understanding when interventions to build relationships could begin. Two experiments asking children (aged 8-17, Experiment 1; aged 4-7, Experiment 2) and adults to perform the same random act of kindness for another person document that both groups significantly underestimate how “big” the act of kindness will seem to recipients, and how positive their act will make recipients feel. Participants significantly undervalued the positive impact of prosociality across ages. Miscalibrated psychological barriers to social connection may emerge early in life.
Journal Article
Undersociality is unwise
Journal of Consumer Psychology
Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2022
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Citation
Kumar, A., & Epley, N. (2023). Undersociality is unwise. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 33(1), 199-212.
Abstract
Wise decisions are often guided by an accurate understanding of the expected values of different possible choices. In social contexts, wisdom comes from understanding how others are likely to respond to one’s actions, enabling people to make choices that maximize both their own and others’ outcomes. Our research suggests that miscalibrated social cognition may create a systematic barrier to wiser decisions in social life. From expressing appreciation to offering support to performing acts of kindness, this program of research indicates that decisions to engage with others are driven by how people expect a recipient to respond, but that people consistently underestimate how positively others will respond to their other-oriented actions. Because connecting with others consistently increases people’s own wellbeing, miscalibrated social cognition may lead to undersociality: being overly reluctant to reach out and connect with others. Miscalibrated expectations about social engagement can create markets for products that help people overcome these barriers in order to consume their time, money, and effort more wisely.
Journal Article
A prosociality paradox: How miscalibrated social cognition creates a misplaced barrier to prosocial action
Current Directions in Psychological Science
Nicholas Epley, Amit Kumar, James Dungan, Margaret Echelbarger
2022
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Citation
Epley, N., Kumar, A., Dungan, J., & Echelbarger, M. (2023). A prosociality paradox: How miscalibrated social cognition creates a misplaced barrier to prosocial action. Current Directions in Psychological Science. doi.org/10.1177/09637214221128016
Abstract
Behaving prosocially can increase wellbeing among both those performing a prosocial act as well as those receiving it, and yet people may experience some reluctance to engage in direct prosocial actions. We review emerging evidence suggesting that miscalibrated social cognition may create a psychological barrier that keeps people from behaving as prosocially as would be optimal for both their own and others’ wellbeing. Across a variety of interpersonal behaviors, those performing prosocial actions tend to underestimate how positively their recipients will respond. These miscalibrated expectations stem partly from divergent perspectives between prosocial actors and recipients, with actors attending relatively more to the competency of their actions and recipients attending relatively more to the warmth conveyed by them. Failing to fully appreciate the positive impact of prosociality on others may keep people from behaving more prosocially in their daily lives, to the detriment of both their own and others’ wellbeing.
Journal Article
A little good goes an unexpectedly long way: Underestimating the positive impact of kindness on recipients.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2023
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Citation
Kumar, A., & Epley, N. (2023). A little good goes an unexpectedly long way: Underestimating the positive impact of kindness on recipients. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152(1), 236–252. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001271
Abstract
Performing random acts of kindness increases happiness in both givers and receivers, but we find that givers systematically undervalue their positive impact on recipients. In both field and laboratory settings (Experiments 1a through 2b), those performing an act of kindness reported how positive they expected recipients would feel and recipients reported how they actually felt. From giving away a cup of hot chocolate in a park to giving away a gift in the lab, those performing a random act of kindness consistently underestimated how positive their recipients would feel, thinking their act was of less value than recipients perceived it to be. Givers’ miscalibrated expectations are driven partly by an egocentric bias in evaluations of the act itself (Experiment 3). Whereas recipients’ positive reactions are enhanced by the warmth conveyed in a kind act, givers’ expectations are relatively insensitive to the warmth conveyed in their action. Underestimating the positive impact of a random act of kindness also leads givers to underestimate the behavioral consequences their prosociality will produce in recipients through indirect reciprocity (Experiment 4). We suggest that givers’ miscalibrated expectations matter because they can create a barrier to engaging in prosocial actions more often in everyday life (Experiments 5a and 5b), which may result in people missing out on opportunities to enhance both their own and others’ well-being.
Journal Article
Talking to strangers is surprisingly informative
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Stav Atir, Kristina Wald, Nicholas Epley
2022
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Citation
Atir, S., Wald, K., & Epley, N. (2022). Talking to strangers is surprisingly informative. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(34), e2206992119.
Abstract
A meaningful amount of people’s knowledge comes from their conversations with others. The amount people expect to learn predicts their interest in having a conversation(Pretests 1-2), suggesting that the presumed information value of conversations guides decisions of whom to talk with. The results of seven experiments, however, suggest that people may systematically underestimate the informational benefit of conversation, creating a barrier to talking with—and hence learning from—others more often in daily life. Participants who were asked to talk with another person expected to learn significantly less from the conversation than they actually reported learning afterwards, regardless of whether they had conversation prompts or not and whether they had the goal to learn or not(Exp 1-2). Undervaluing conversation does not stem from having systematically poor opinions of how much others know (Exp 3), but is instead related to the inherent uncertainty involved in conversation itself. Consequently, people underestimate learning to a lesser extent when uncertainty is reduced, as in a nonsocial context (surfing the web, Exp 4),when talking to an acquainted conversation partner(Exp 5), and after knowing the content of the conversation (Exp 6). Underestimating learning in conversation is distinct from underestimating other positive qualities in conversation, such as enjoyment(Exp 7). Misunderstanding how much can be learned in conversation could keep people from learning more from others in daily life.
Journal Article
Hello, stranger?: Pleasant conversations are preceded by concerns about starting one.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
Juliana Schroeder, Donald Lyons, Nicholas Epley
2022
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Citation
Schroeder, J., Lyons, D., & Epley, N. (in press). Hello, stranger?: Pleasant conversations arepreceded by concerns about starting one. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.
Abstract
Connecting with others makes people happier, but strangers in close proximity often ignore each other. Prior research (Epley & Schroeder, 2014) suggested this social disconnection stems from people misunderstanding how pleasant it would be to talk with strangers. Extending these prior results, in a field experiment with London-area train commuters, those assigned to talk with a stranger reported having a significantly more positive experience, and learning significantly more, than those assigned to a solitude or control condition. Commuters also expected a more positive experience if they talked to a stranger than in the solitude or control conditions. A second experiment explored why commuters nevertheless avoid conversation even when it is generally pleasant. Commuters predicted that trying to have a conversation would be less pleasant than actually having one because they anticipated that others would be uninterested in talking. These experiments clarify the precise aspects of social interaction that may be misunderstood. People may avoid pleasant conversations with strangers because of miscalibrated concerns about starting them.
Journal Article
Understanding undersociality: Intentions, impressions, and interactions.
Journal of Consumer Psychology
Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2022
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Citation
Kumar, A., & Epley, N. (2022). Understanding undersociality: Intentions, impressions, and interactions. Journal of Consumer Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1332
Abstract
Ratner, Kim, and Wu (2023) and Silver and Small (2023) raise deeply interesting questions about the broad consequences of increasing sociality, about people's ability to anticipate the outcomes of sociality, and about broader issues people may be considering when thinking of connecting with another person. We focus this response on the potential role of intentions and anticipated impressions in affecting undersociality, as well as the possibility of interactions that could moderate the gap between people's expectations of social engagement and their actual experiences. Many unanswered and important questions remain in need of critical empirical attention. We encourage future research that provides a better understanding of undersociality by focusing on intentions, impressions, and interactions.
Journal Article
Surprisingly happy to have helped: Underestimating prosociality creates a misplaced barrier to asking for help
Psychological Science
Xuan Zhao, Nicholas Epley
2022
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Citation
Zhao, X., & Epley, N. (2022). Surprisingly happy to have helped: Underestimating prosociality creates a misplaced barrier to asking for help. Psychological Science.
Abstract
Performing acts of kindness increases well-being, yet people can be reluctant to ask for
help that would enable others’ kindness. We suggest people may be overly reluctant due to
miscalibrated expectations about others’ prosocial motivation, underestimating how positively
others will feel when asked for help. A pretest identified that interest in asking for help was
correlated with expectations of how helpers would feel, but a series of scenarios, recalled
experiences, and live interactions among people in the U.S. (n = 2118) indicated that those
needing help consistently underestimated others’ willingness to help, underestimated how
positively helpers would feel, and overestimated how inconvenienced helpers would feel. These
miscalibrated expectations stemmed from underestimating helpers’ prosocial motivation, while
overestimating compliance motivation. This research highlights a limitation of construing helpseeking through a lens of compliance by scholars and laypeople alike. Undervaluing prosociality
could create a misplaced barrier to asking for help when needed
Journal Article
Undersociality: Miscalibrated social cognition can inhibit social connection
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Nicholas Epley, Michael Kardas, Xuan Zhao, Stav Atir, Juliana Schroeder
2022
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Citation
Epley, N., Kardas, M., Zhao, X., Atir, S., & Schroeder, J. (2022). Undersociality: Miscalibrated social cognition can inhibit social connection. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 26(5), 406-618. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.02.007
Abstract
A person’s well-being depends heavily on forming and maintaining positive rela- tionships, but people can be reluctant to connect in ways that would create or strengthen relationships. Emerging research suggests that miscalibrated social cognition may create psychological barriers to connecting with others more often. Specifically, people may underestimate how positively others will re- spond to their own sociality across a variety of social actions, including engaging in conversation, expressing appreciation, and performing acts of kindness. We suggest that these miscalibrated expectations are created and maintained by at least three mechanisms: differential construal, uncertain responsiveness, and asymmetric learning. Underestimating the positive consequences of social engagement could make people less social than would be optimal for both their own and others’ well-being.
Journal Article
Too reluctant to reach out: Receiving social support is more positive than expressers expect.
Psychological Science
James Dungan, David Munguia Gomez, Nicholas Epley
2022
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Citation
Dungan, J.M., Munguia Gomez, D.A., & Epley, N. (2022). Too reluctant to reach out: Receiving social support is more positive than expressers expect. Psychological Science, 33(8), 1300-1312.
Abstract
Receiving social support is critical for wellbeing, but concerns about a recipient’s reaction could
make people reluctant to express it. Our studies indicate that people’s expectations about how
their support will be received predict their likelihood of expressing it (Study 1, N = 100 online
adults), but these expectations are systematically miscalibrated. Participants who sent messages
of support to others they knew (Study 2, N = 120 students), or who expressed support to a new
acquaintance in person (Study 3, N = 50 adult pairs), consistently underestimated how positively
their recipients would respond. A systematic perspective gap between expressers and recipients
may explain miscalibrated expectations, such that expressers focus on how competent their
support seems while recipients focus on the warmth it conveys (Study 4, N = 300 adults).
Miscalibrated concerns about how to express support most competently may make people overly
reluctant to reach out to someone in need.
Journal Article
Overly shallow?: Miscalibrated expectations create a barrier to deeper conversation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Michael Kardas, Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2022
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Citation
Kardas, M., Kumar, A., & Epley, N. (2022). Overly shallow?: Miscalibrated expectations create a barrier to deeper conversation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 122(3), 367–398.
Abstract
People may want deep and meaningful relationships with others, but may also be reluctant to engage in the deep and meaningful conversations with strangers that could create those relationships. We hypothesized that people systematically underestimate how caring and interested distant strangers are in one’s own intimate revelations and that these miscalibrated expectations create a psychological barrier to deeper conversations. As predicted, conversations between strangers felt less awkward, and created more connectedness and happiness, than the participants themselves expected (Experiments 1a-5). Participants were especially prone to overestimate how awkward deep conversations would be compared to shallow conversations (Experiments 2-5). Notably, they also felt more connected to deep conversation partners than shallow conversation partners after having both types of conversations (Experiments 6a-b). Systematic differences between expectations and experiences arose because participants expected others to care less about their disclosures in conversation than others actually did (Experiments 1a, 1b, 4a, 4b, 5, 6a). As a result, participants more accurately predicted the outcomes of their conversations when speaking with close friends, family, or partners whose care and interest is more clearly known (Experiment 5). Miscalibrated expectations about others matter because they guide decisions about which topics to discuss in conversation, such that more calibrated expectations encourage deeper conversation (Experiments 7a-7b). Misunderstanding others can encourage overly shallow interactions
Popular Media
Small talk is boring. Our research shows how you can do better.
The Washington Post
Nicholas Epley, Michael Kardas, Amit Kumar
2021
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Citation
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/10/13/posteverything-small-talk-deeper-conversations
Abstract
As covid-19 cases continue to drop, Americans who have been careful about social distancing are coming out of social hibernation and meeting new people again. This could mean returning to the dreaded world of small talk. “Hey, what’s up?” “Terrible weather we’re having, isn’t it?” Given such shallow exchanges, you would be excused for wondering whether another period of social distancing would be preferable. In surveys we have conducted, most people said they wished they had more meaningful conversations in their daily lives. This is a wise inclination: Behavioral science research consistently finds that the more deep and intimate conversations people have on a given day, the happier they are that day. The more time people spend in small talk, in contrast, the more likely they are to feel — well, not much of anything in particular. Small talk is conversation’s purgatory, biding time waiting for the good stuff.
Journal Article
Insufficiently complimentary?: Underestimating the positive impact of compliments creates a barrier to expressing them
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Xuan Zhao, Nicholas Epley
2021
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Citation
Zhao, X., & Epley, N. (2021). Insufficiently complimentary?: Underestimating the positive impact of compliments creates a barrier to expressing them. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 121, 239-256.
Abstract
Compliments increase the well-being of both expressers and recipients, yet people report in a series of surveys giving fewer compliments than they should give, or would like to give. Nine experiments suggest that a reluctance to express genuine compliments partly stems from underestimating the positive impact that compliments will have on recipients. Participants wrote genuine compliments and then predicted how happy and awkward those compliments would make recipients feel. Expressers consistently underestimated how positive the recipients would feel while overestimating how awkward recipients would feel (Experiments 1-3, S4). These miscalibrated expectations are driven partly by perspective gaps in which expressers underestimate how competent—and to a lesser extent how warm—their compliments will be perceived by recipients (Experiments 1-3). Because people’s interest in expressing a compliment is partly driven by their expectations of the recipient’s reaction, undervaluing a compliment creates a barrier to expressing them (Supplemental Experiments S2, S3, S4). As a result, directing people to focus on the warmth conveyed by their compliment (Experiment 4), increased interest in expressing it. We believe these findings reflect a more general tendency to underestimate the positive impact of their prosocial actions on others, leading people to be less prosocial than would be optimal for both their own and others’ well-being
Journal Article
It’s surprisingly nice to hear you: Misunderstanding the impact of communication media can lead to suboptimal choices of how to connect with others
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2021
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Citation
Kumar, A., & Epley, N. (2021). It’s surprisingly nice to hear you: Misunderstanding the impact of communication media can lead to suboptimal choices of how to connect with others. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150, 595-607.
Abstract
Positive social connections improve wellbeing. Technology increasingly affords a wide variety of media that people can use to connect with others, but not all media strengthen social connection equally. Optimizing wellbeing, therefore, requires choosing how to connect with others wisely. We predicted that people’s preferences for communication media would be at least partly guided by the expected costs and benefits of the interaction—specifically, how awkward or uncomfortable the interaction would be and how connected they would feel to their partner— but that people’s expectations would consistently undervalue the overall benefit of more intimate voice-based interactions. We tested this hypothesis by asking participants in a field experiment to reconnect with an old friend either over the phone or e-mail, and by asking laboratory participants to “chat” with a stranger over video, voice, or text-based media. Results indicated that interactions including voice (phone, video chat, and voice chat) created stronger social bonds and no increase in awkwardness, compared with interactions including text (e-mail, text chat), but miscalibrated expectations about awkwardness or connection could lead to suboptimal preferences for text-based media. Misunderstanding the consequences of using different communication media could create preferences for media that do not maximize either one’s own or others’ wellbeing.
Journal Article
Kind words do not become tired words: Undervaluing the positive impact of frequent compliments
Self & Identity
Xuan Zhao, Nicholas Epley
2021
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Citation
Zhao, X., & Epley, N. (2021). Kind words do not become tired words: Undervaluing the positiveimpact of frequent compliments. Self and Identity, 20, 25-46.
Abstract
Compliments can satisfy others’ need to belong, but expressers may underestimate their positive impact on recipients, creating a barrier to giving them more often. We assess how people expect recipients will react to multiple compliments over time, compared to recipients’ actual experiences. Participants expected that recipients would adopt to multiple compliments, with each feeling less positive and sincere (Experiment 1). An experiment found no evidence of adaptation in recipients’ actual experience, while expressers underestimated recipients’ positive reactions (Experiment 2). Participants expected less adaptation among recipients when they saw the actual compliments received, suggesting that mistaken adaptation beliefs stem from overestimating similarity between multiple compliments (Experiment 3). Underestimating compliments’ consistently positive impact may restrain people from expressing them more routinely.
Journal Article
Demeaning: Dehumanizing others by minimizing the importance of their psychological needs
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Juliana Schroeder and Nicholas Epley
2020
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Citation
Schroeder, J., & Epley, N. (in press). Demeaning: Dehumanizing others by minimizing the importance of their psychological needs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Abstract
We document a tendency to “demean” others’ needs: believing that psychological needs—those requiring mental capacity, and hence more uniquely human (e.g., need for meaning and autonomy)—are relatively less important to others compared to physical needs—those shared with other biological agents, and hence more animalistic (e.g., need for food and sleep). Because valuing psychological needs requires a sophisticated humanlike mind, agents presumed to have relatively weaker mental capacities should also be presumed to value psychological needs less compared to biological needs. Supporting this, our studies found that people demeaned the needs of non-human animals (e.g., chimpanzees) and historically dehumanized groups (e.g., drug addicts) more than the needs of close friends or oneself (Studies 1 and 3). Because mental capacities are more readily recognized through introspection than by external observation, people also demean peers’ needs more than their own, inferring that one’s own behavior is guided more strongly by psychological needs than identical behavior in others (Study 4). Two additional experiments suggest that demeaning could be a systematic error (Studies 5 and 6), as charity donors and students underestimated the importance of homeless people’s psychological (versus physical) needs compared to self-reports and choices from homeless people. Underestimating the importance of others’ psychological needs could impair the ability to help others. These experiments indicate that demeaning is a unique facet of dehumanization reflecting a reliable, consequential, and potentially mistaken understanding of others’ minds.
Popular Media
Type less, talk more
Harvard Business Review
Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2020
Abstract
Modern communication media allow us to exchange information with others using text, voice, and audiovisual cues. But because communication also involves maintaining social relationships that are critical for our happiness, health, and the smooth running of a business, reaching out to others requires deciding how best to do so. And in this regard, the value of voice is key. We recently conducted several experiments that suggest people undervalue the positive relational consequences of using voice relative to text alone, leading them to favor typing rather than talking—a potentially unwise preference.
Book Chapter
Understanding the minds of others: Activation, application, and accuracy of mind perception
Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles
Nicholas Epley, Michael Kardas
2020
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Citation
Epley, N., & Kardas, M. (2020). Understanding the minds of others: Activation, application, and accuracy of mind perception. Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Third Edition. New York: Guilford.
Abstract
Here we cover the basic psychological processes that comprise what may be the human
brain’s most impressive capacity. Engaging with the mind of another person requires this
capacity to be activated, and the factors that govern activation can explain both
anthropomorphism and dehumanization. Once activated, at least three basic processes guide the
inferences people make about others’ mental states and capabilities: egocentrism, stereotyping, 4
and behavioral inference. These processes can work both in isolation and in coordination with
each other, based on the information people have available to them at the time of judgment.
Each process provides some accuracy but also some systematic error. Understanding these
processes enables insight into both the remarkable insight that people can have into the minds of
others, and also the potentially painful mistakes people make that can create misunderstanding
and conflict.
Journal Article
Escalation of negative social exchange: Reflexive punishment or deliberative deterrence?
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
James Vandermeer, Christine Hosey, Nicholas Epley, Boaz Keysar
2019
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Citation
Vandermeer, J., Hosey, C., Epley, N., & Keysar, B. (2019). Escalation of negative social exchange: Reflexive punishment or deliberative deterrence? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 84, 103823.
Abstract
Negative escalation of social exchange exacts significant costs on both individuals and society. Instead of in-kind reciprocity—an eye for an eye—negative reciprocity may escalate, taking two eyes for an eye. We tested two competing mechanisms for negative escalation using a modified dictator game that reliably produces escalating reciprocity to others' negative actions but not to positive actions. According to one mechanism, escalation is strategic: a deliberate attempt to deter future harm. According to another mechanism, escalation is reflexive: an impulsive act of retribution without consideration of future consequences. In seven experiments, we find clear evidence consistent with a reflexive mechanism. Encouraging deliberation reduced negative escalation in one-shot interactions as well as in repeated interactions. Focusing on future consequences decreased escalation whereas disabling deliberation increased escalation. Finally, the explicit goal to punish another's negative behavior increased escalation while the goal of deterring future transgressions did not. These experiments suggest that escalation is a reflexive form of punishment rather than a deliberate act of strategic deterrence. Encouraging, enabling, or training deliberative processes may effectively reduce costly escalation in everyday life
Popular Media
The surprising benefits of talking to strangers
BBC News
Nicholas Epley, Juliana Schroeder
2019
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Citation
Epley, N, & Schroeder, J. (June 12, 2019). The surprising benefits of talking to strangers. BBC News.
Abstract
Most people spend part of every day surrounded by strangers, whether on their daily commute, sitting in a park or cafe, or visiting the supermarket. Yet many of us remain in self-imposed isolation, believing that reaching out to a stranger would make you both feel uncomfortable. These beliefs may be unwarranted. In fact, our research suggests we may often underestimate the positive impact of connecting with others for both our own and others' wellbeing.
Popular Media
How to design an ethical culture
Harvard Business Review
Nicholas Epley, Amit Kumar
2019
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Citation
Epley, N., & Kumar, A. (2019). How to design an ethical culture. Harvard Business Review.
Abstract
From Volkswagen’s emissions fiasco to Wells Fargo’s deceptive sales practices to Uber’s privacy intrusions, corporate wrongdoing is a continuing reality in global business. Unethical behavior takes a significant toll on organizations by damaging reputations, harming employee morale, and increasing regulatory costs—not to mention the wider damage to society’s overall trust in business. Few executives set out to achieve advantage by breaking the rules, and most companies have programs in place to prevent malfeasance at all levels. Yet recurring scandals show that we could do better.
Journal Article
Through a looking glass, darkly: Using mechanisms of mind perception to identify accuracy, overconfidence, and underappreciate means for improvement
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
Nicholas Epley, Tal Eyal
2019
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Citation
Epley, N., & Eyal, T. (2019). Through a looking glass, darkly: Using mechanisms of mind perception to identify accuracy, overconfidence, and underappreciated means for improvement. In J. M. Olson (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 65–120). Elsevier Academic Press.
Abstract
People care about the minds of others, attempting to understand others’ thoughts,
attitudes, beliefs, intentions, and emotions using a highly sophisticated process of social
cognition. Others’ minds are among the most complicated systems that any person will ever
think about, meaning that inferences about them are also made with imperfect accuracy.
Research on the processes that enable mental state inference has largely developed in isolation
from the literature carefully examining the accuracy of these inferences, leaving the former
literature somewhat impractical and the latter somewhat atheoretical. We weave these literatures
together by describing how basic mechanisms that govern the activation and application of
mental state inferences help to explain systematic patterns of accuracy, error, and confidence in
mind perception. Altering any of these basic processes, such as through perspective taking or
increasing attention to behavioral cues, is likely to increase accuracy only in very specific
circumstances. We suggest the most widely effective method for increasing accuracy is to avoid
these inference processes altogether by getting another’s perspective directly (what we refer to as
perspective getting). Those in the midst of understanding the mind of another, however, seem
largely unable to detect when they are using an effective versus ineffective strategy while
engaging in mind reading, meaning that the most effective approaches for increasing
interpersonal understanding are likely to be highly undervalued. Understanding how mind
perception is activated and applied can explain accuracy and error, identifying effective
strategies that mind readers may nevertheless fail to appreciate in their everyday lives.
Popular Media
Perspective-taking doesn’t help you understand what others want
Harvard Business Review
Tal Eyal, Mary Steffel, Nicholas Epley
2018
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Eyal, T., Steffel, M., & Epley, N. (October 9, 2018). Perspective-taking doesn’t help you understand what others want. Harvard Business Review.
Abstract
Ingvar Kamprad, the founder of IKEA, realized that being a good leader required being a good mind reader. “I see my task as serving the majority of people,” he said in an interview to Forbes. “The question is, how do you find out what they want?” For many business leaders who want to understand the minds of their employees, customers, or competitors, the answer seems obvious: Do some perspective-taking. That is, do your best to deliberately try to see things from the other person’s point of view, imagining that you were in his or her shoes.
Journal Article
A Mind like Mine: The Exceptionally Ordinary Underpinnings of Anthropomorphism
Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
Nicholas Epley
2018
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Epley, N. (2018). A mind like mine: The exceptionally ordinary underpinnings of anthropomorphism. Journal of the Association for Consumer Research, 3(4), 591-598.
Abstract
From computers to cars to cell phones, consumers interact with inanimate objects on a daily basis. Despite being mindless machines, consumers nevertheless routinely attribute humanlike mental capacities of intentions, beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge to them. This process of anthropomorphism has historically been treated as an exceptional belief, explained away as simply an inevitable outcome of human nature or as an occasional product of human stupidity. Recent scientific advances, however, have revealed the very ordinary processes of social cognition underlying anthropomorphism. These processes enable psychologists to predict variability in the magnitude of anthropomorphism across contexts and also connect it to the inverse phenomena of dehumanization whereby people treat other human beings as if they lack a humanlike mind. Consumer behavior researchers are uniquely equipped to study these processes, to identify the precise situational features that give rise to anthropomorphism, to understand implications for consumer welfare, and to predict important consequences for how people treat everything from machines to animals to other human beings.
Journal Article
Undervaluing gratitude: Expressers misunderstand the consequences of showing appreciation
Psychological Science
Amit Kumar, Nicholas Epley
2018
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Kumar, A., & Epley, N. (2018). Undervaluing gratitude: Expressers misunderstand the consequences of showing appreciation. Psychological Science, 29, 1423-1435.
Abstract
Expressing gratitude improves well-being for both expressers and recipients, but we suggest that an egocentric bias may lead expressers to systematically undervalue its positive impact on recipients in a way that could keep people from expressing gratitude more often in everyday life. Participants in three experiments wrote gratitude letters and then predicted how surprised, happy, and awkward recipients would feel. Recipients then reported how receiving an expression of gratitude actually made them feel. Expressers significantly underestimated how surprised recipients would be about why expressers were grateful, overestimated how awkward recipients would feel, and underestimated how positive recipients would feel. Expected awkwardness and mood were both correlated with participants’ willingness to express gratitude. Wise decisions are guided by an accurate assessment of the expected value of action. Underestimating the value of prosocial actions, such as expressing gratitude, may keep people from engaging in behavior that would maximize their own—and others’—well-being.
Journal Article
Perspective mistaking: Accurately understanding the mind of another requires getting perspective, not taking perspective
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Tal Eyal, Mary Steffel, Nicholas Epley
2018
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Citation
Eyal, T., Steffel, M., & Epley, N. (2018). Perspective mistaking: Accurately understanding the mind of another requires getting perspective, not taking perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 114(4), 547-571.
Abstract
Taking another person’s perspective is widely presumed to increase interpersonal understanding. Very few experiments, however, have actually tested whether perspective taking increases accuracy when predicting another person’s thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or other mental states. Those that do yield inconsistent results, or they confound accuracy with egocentrism. Here we report 25 experiments testing whether being instructed to adopt another person’s perspective increases interpersonal insight. These experiments include a wide range of accuracy tests that disentangle egocentrism and accuracy, such as predicting another person’s emotions from facial expressions and body postures, predicting fake versus genuine smiles, predicting when a person is lying or telling the truth, and predicting a spouse’s activity preferences and consumer attitudes. Although a large majority of pretest participants believed that perspective taking would systematically increase accuracy on these tasks, we failed to find any consistent evidence that it actually did so. If anything, perspective taking decreased accuracy overall while occasionally increasing confidence in judgment. Perspective taking reduced egocentric biases, but the information used in its place was not systematically more accurate. A final experiment confirmed that getting another person’s perspective directly, through conversation, increased accuracy but that perspective taking did not. Increasing interpersonal accuracy seems to require gaining new information rather than utilizing existing knowledge about another person. Understanding the mind of another person is therefore enabled by getting perspective, not simply taking perspective.
Popular Media
We all think we know the people we love; We are all deluded.
National Public Radio
Nicholas Epley
2018
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Citation
Epley, N. (March 22, 2018). We all think we know the people we love; We are all deluded. National Public Radio (NPR.org).
Abstract
Welcome to a new season of Invisibilia! The NPR program and podcast explores the invisible forces that shape human behavior. Episode 3 involves two brothers who are happy about the polite, helpful tenant who moves into their mother's house, until they start to suspect he has sinister motives. Here at Shots, we are exploring the main theme of the story — the things left unsaid, and the havoc they can cause on your personal relationships — with an essay by behavioral scientist Nicholas Epley.
Journal Article
The humanizing voice: Speech reveals, and text conceals, a more thoughtful mind in the midst of disagreement
Psychological Science
Juliana Schroeder, Michael Kardas, Nicholas Epley
2017
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Schroeder, J., Kardas, M., & Epley, N. (2017). The humanizing voice: Speech reveals, and text conceals, a more thoughtful mind in the midst of disagreement. Psychological Science, 28, 1745-1762.
Abstract
A person’s speech communicates his or her thoughts and feelings. We predicted that beyond conveying the contents of a person’s mind, a person’s speech also conveys mental capacity, such that hearing a person explain his or her beliefs makes the person seem more mentally capable—and therefore seem to possess more uniquely human mental traits—than reading the same content. We expected this effect to emerge when people are perceived as relatively mindless, such as when they disagree with the evaluator’s own beliefs. Three experiments involving polarizing attitudinal issues and political opinions supported these hypotheses. A fourth experiment identified paralinguistic cues in the human voice that convey basic mental capacities. These results suggest that the medium through which people communicate may systematically influence the impressions they form of each other. The tendency to denigrate the minds of the opposition may be tempered by giving them, quite literally, a voice.
Journal Article
Exaggerating accessible differences: When gender stereotype overestimate actual group differences
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Tal Eyal, Nicholas Epley
2017
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Eyal, T., & Epley, N.(2017) . Exaggerating accessible differences: When gender stereotype overestimate actual group differences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43, 1323 - 1336.
Abstract
Stereotypes are often presumed to exaggerate group differences, but empirical evidence is mixed. We suggest exaggeration is moderated by the accessibility of specific stereotype content. In particular, because the most accessible stereotype contents are attributes perceived to differ between groups, those attributes are most likely to exaggerate actual group differences due to regression to the mean. We tested this hypothesis using a highly accessible gender stereotype: that women are more socially sensitive than men. We confirmed that the most accessible stereotype content involves attributes perceived to differ between groups (pretest), and that these stereotypes contain some accuracy but significantly exaggerate actual gender differences (Experiment 1). We observe less exaggeration when judging less accessible stereotype content (Experiment 2), or when judging individual men and women (Experiment 3). Considering the accessibility of specific stereotype content may explain when stereotypes exaggerate actual group differences and when they do not.
Journal Article
Less evil than you: Bounded self-righteousness in character inferences, emotional reactions, and behavioral extremes
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Nadav Klein, Nicholas Epley
2017
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Klein, N., & Epley, N. (2017). Less evil than you: Bounded self-righteousness in character inferences, emotional reactions, and behavioral extremes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43, 1202 - 1212.
Abstract
Recent research suggests that self-righteousness is bounded, arising more reliably in evaluations of immoral actions than in evaluations of moral actions. Here, we test four implications of this asymmetry in self-righteousness and the mechanism explaining it. We find that people are less likely to make negative character inferences from their own unethical behavior than from others’ unethical behavior (Experiment 1), believe they would feel worse after an unethical action than others (Experiment 2), and believe they are less capable of extreme unethical behavior than others (Experiment 3). We observe weaker self–other differences in evaluations of ethical actions. This occurs partly because people base evaluations of themselves on their own moral intentions, leading to predictable individual differences. People more likely to ascribe cynical motives to their own behavior exhibit a smaller asymmetry in self-righteousness (Experiment 4). Self-righteousness seems better characterized as feeling “less evil than thou” than feeling “holier than thou.”
Journal Article
Endorsing help for others that you oppose for yourself: Mind perception alters the perceived effectiveness of paternalism
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Juliana Schroeder, Adam Waytz, Nicholas Epley
2017
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Schroeder, J., Waytz, A., & Epley, N. (2017). Endorsing help for others that you oppose for yourself: Mind perception alters the perceived effectiveness of paternalism. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146, 1106 - 1125.
Abstract
How people choose to help each other can be just as important as how much people help. Help can come through relatively paternalistic or agentic aid. Paternalistic aid, such as banning certain foods to encourage weight loss or donating food to alleviate poverty, restricts recipients’ choices compared with agentic aid, such as providing calorie counts or donating cash. Nine experiments demonstrate that how people choose to help depends partly on their beliefs about the recipient’s mental capacities. People perceive paternalistic aid to be more effective for those who seem less mentally capable (Experiments 1 and 2), and people therefore give more paternalistically when others are described as relatively incompetent (Experiment 3). Because people tend to believe that they are more mentally capable than are others, people also believe that paternalistic aid will be more effective for others than for oneself, effectively treating other adults more like children (Experiments 4a–5b). Experiencing a personal mental shortcoming—overeating on Thanksgiving—therefore increased the perceived effectiveness of paternalism for oneself, such that participants thought paternalistic antiobesity policies would be more effective when surveyed the day after Thanksgiving than the day before (Experiment 6). A final experiment demonstrates that the link between perceived effectiveness of aid and mental capacity is bidirectional: Those receiving paternalistic aid were perceived as less mentally capable than those receiving relatively agentic aid (Experiment 7). Beliefs about how best to help someone in need are affected by subtle inferences about the mind of the person in need.
Journal Article
Inferring perspective versus getting perspective: Underestimating the value of being in another’s shoes
Psychological Science
Haotian Zhou, Elizabeth A. Majka, Nicholas Epley
2017
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Zhou, H., Majka, L., & Epley, N. (2017). Inferring perspective versus getting perspective: Underestimating the value of being in another’s shoes. Psychological Science.
Abstract
People use at least two strategies to solve the challenge of understanding another person’s mind: inferring that person’s perspective by reading his or her behavior (theorization) and getting that person’s perspective by experiencing his or her situation (simulation). The five experiments reported here demonstrate a strong tendency for people to underestimate the value of simulation. Predictors estimated a stranger’s emotional reactions toward 50 pictures. They could either infer the stranger’s perspective by reading his or her facial expressions or simulate the stranger’s perspective by watching the pictures he or she viewed. Predictors were substantially more accurate when they got perspective through simulation, but overestimated the accuracy they had achieved by inferring perspective. Predictors’ miscalibrated confidence stemmed from overestimating the information revealed through facial expressions and underestimating the similarity in people’s reactions to a given situation. People seem to underappreciate a useful strategy for understanding the minds of others, even after they gain firsthand experience with both strategies.
Journal Article
Treating ethics as a design problem
Behavioral Science & Policy
Nicholas Epley, David Tannenbaum
2017
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Epley, N., & Tannenbaum, D. (2017). Treating ethics as a design problem. Behavioral Science and Policy, 3, 73-84.
Abstract
Creating policies that encourage ethical behavior requires an accurate understanding of what drives such behavior. We first describe three common myths about the psychological causes of ethical behavior that can lead policymakers to overlook constructive interventions. These myths suggest that ethical behavior stems from a person’s beliefs; changing behavior therefore requires changing beliefs. Behavioral science, however, indicates that the immediate context (such as an organization’s norms and accepted procedures) exerts a surprisingly powerful influence on behavior. To be efective, policies must treat ethics as a design problem; that is, policymakers should create contexts that promote ethical actions. We then discuss three psychological processes that afect ethical activity—attention, construal, and motivation—and describe how understanding them can help policymakers in the public and private sectors design environments that promote ethical behavior.
Journal Article
The mechanics of motivated reasoning
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Nicholas Epley, Thomas Gilovich
2016
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Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2016). The mechanics of motivated reasoning. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30, 133-140.
Abstract
Whenever we see voters explain away their preferred candidate's weaknesses, dieters assert that a couple scoops of ice cream won't really hurt their weight loss goals, or parents maintain that their children are unusually gifted, we are reminded that people's preferences can affect their beliefs. This idea is captured in the common saying, "People believe what they want to believe." But people don't simply believe what they want to believe. Psychological research makes it clear that "motivated beliefs" are guided by motivated reasoning--reasoning in the service of some self-interest, to be sure, but reasoning nonetheless. People generally reason their way to conclusions they favor, with their preferences influencing the way evidence is gathered, arguments are processed, and memories of past experience are recalled. Each of these processes can be affected in subtle ways by people's motivations, leading to biased beliefs that feel objective. In this symposium introduction, we set the stage for discussion of motivated beliefs in the papers that follow by providing more detail about the underlying psychological processes that guide motivated reasoning.
Journal Article
Mistaking minds and machines: How speech affects dehumanization and anthropomorphism
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Juliana Schroeder, Nicholas Epley
2016
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Schroeder, J., & Epley, N. (2016). Mistaking minds and machines: How speech affects dehumanization and anthropomorphism. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 1427-1437.
Abstract
Treating a human mind like a machine is an essential component of dehumanization, whereas attributing a humanlike mind to a machine is an essential component of anthropomorphism. Here we tested how a cue closely connected to a person's actual mental experience-a humanlike voice-affects the likelihood of mistaking a person for a machine, or a machine for a person. We predicted that paralinguistic cues in speech are particularly likely to convey the presence of a humanlike mind, such that removing voice from communication (leaving only text) would increase the likelihood of mistaking the text's creator for a machine. Conversely, adding voice to a computer-generated script (resulting in speech) would increase the likelihood of mistaking the text's creator for a human. Four experiments confirmed these hypotheses, demonstrating that people are more likely to infer a human (vs. computer) creator when they hear a voice expressing thoughts than when they read the same thoughts in text. Adding human visual cues to text (i.e., seeing a person perform a script in a subtitled video clip), did not increase the likelihood of inferring a human creator compared with only reading text, suggesting that defining features of personhood may be conveyed more clearly in speech (Experiments 1 and 2). Removing the naturalistic paralinguistic cues that convey humanlike capacity for thinking and feeling, such as varied pace and intonation, eliminates the humanizing effect of speech (Experiment 4). We discuss implications for dehumanizing others through text-based media, and for anthropomorphizing machines through speech-based media.
Journal Article
Many hands make overlooked work: Overclaiming of responsibility increases with group size
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
Juliana Schroeder, Eugene M Caruso, Nicholas Epley
2016
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Schroeder, J., Caruso, E.M., & Epley, N. (2016). Many hands make overlooked work: Overclaiming of responsibility increases with group size. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 22, 238-246.
Abstract
Logically, group members cannot be responsible for more than 100% of the group’s output, yet claims of responsibility routinely sum to more than 100%. This “over-claiming” occurs partly because of egocentrism: People focus on their own contributions, as focal members of the group, more than on others’ contributions. Therefore, we predicted that over-claiming would increase with group size because larger groups leave more contributions from others to overlook. In 2 field studies, participants claimed more responsibility as the number of academic authors per article and the number of MBA students per study group increased. As predicted by our theoretical account, this over-claiming bias was reduced when group members considered others’ contributions explicitly. Two experiments that directly manipulated group size replicated these results. Members of larger groups may be particularly well advised to consider other members’ contributions before considering their own.
Journal Article
Maybe holier, but definitely less evil, than you: Bounded self-righteousness in social judgment
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Nadav Klein, Nicholas Epley
2016
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Klein, N., & Epley, N. (2016). Maybe holier, but definitely less evil, than you: Bounded self-righteousness in social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110, 660-674.
Abstract
Few biases in human judgment are easier to demonstrate than self-righteousness: the tendency to believe one is more moral than others. Existing research, however, has overlooked an important ambiguity in evaluations of one’s own and others’ moral behavior that could lead to an overly simplistic characterization of self-righteousness. In particular, moral behavior spans a broad spectrum ranging from doing good to doing bad. Self-righteousness could indicate believing that one is more likely to do good than others, less likely to do bad, or both. Based on cognitive and motivational mechanisms, we predicted an asymmetry in the degree of self-righteousness such that it would be larger when considering unethical actions (doing bad) than when considering ethical actions (doing good). A series of experiments confirmed this prediction. A final experiment suggests that this asymmetry is partly produced by the difference in perspectives that people adopt when evaluating themselves and others (Experiment 8). These results all suggest a bounded sense of self-righteousness. Believing one “less evil than thou” seems more reliable than believing one is “holier than thou.”
Popular Media
The science of sounding smart
Harvard Business Review
Nicholas Epley, Juliana Schroeder
2015
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Citation
Schroeder, J., & Epley, N. (October 7, 2015). The science of sounding smart. Harvard Business Review.
Abstract
When you’re trying to convey the quality of your mind to your boss, or to a company that’s considering you for a job, your best ally may be your own voice. Although some people may assume that their ideas and intellect would come across much better in written form, it turns out that using your voice can make you sound smarter.
Journal Article
Group discussion improves lie detection
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Nadav Klein, Nicholas Epley
2015
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Klein, N., & Epley, N. (2015). Group discussion improves lie detection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112, 7460-7465.
Abstract
Groups of individuals can sometimes make more accurate judgments than the average individual could make alone. We tested whether this group advantage extends to lie detection, an exceptionally challenging judgment with accuracy rates rarely exceeding chance. In four experiments, we find that groups are consistently more accurate than individuals in distinguishing truths from lies, an effect that comes primarily from an increased ability to correctly identify when a person is lying. These experiments demonstrate that the group advantage in lie detection comes through the process of group discussion, and is not a product of aggregating individual opinions (a "wisdom-of-crowds" effect) or of altering response biases (such as reducing the "truth bias"). Interventions to improve lie detection typically focus on improving individual judgment, a costly and generally ineffective endeavor. Our findings suggest a cheap and simple synergistic approach of enabling group discussion before rendering a judgment.
Journal Article
The sound of intellect: Speech reveals a thoughtful mind, increasing a job candidate’s appeal
Psychological Science
Juliana Schroeder, Nicholas Epley
2015
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Schroeder, J., & Epley, N. (2015). The sound of intellect: Speech reveals a thoughtful mind, increasing a job candidate’s appeal. Psychological Science, 26, 877-891.
Abstract
A person's mental capacities, such as intellect, cannot be observed directly and so are instead inferred from indirect cues. We predicted that a person's intellect would be conveyed most strongly through a cue closely tied to actual thinking: his or her voice. Hypothetical employers (Experiments 1-3b) and professional recruiters (Experiment 4) watched, listened to, or read job candidates' pitches about why they should be hired. These evaluators rated a candidate as more competent, thoughtful, and intelligent when they heard a pitch rather than read it and, as a result, had a more favorable impression of the candidate and were more interested in hiring the candidate. Adding voice to written pitches, by having trained actors (Experiment 3a) or untrained adults (Experiment 3b) read them, produced the same results. Adding visual cues to audio pitches did not alter evaluations of the candidates. For conveying one's intellect, it is important that one's voice, quite literally, be heard.
Journal Article
It pays to be nice, but not really nice: Asymmetric evaluations of prosociality across seven cultures
Judgment and Decision Making
Nadav Klein, Igor Grossmann, Ayse K. Uskul, Alexandra A. Kraus, Nicholas Epley
2015
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Klein, N., Grossman, I., Uskul, A., Kraus, A.A., & Epley, N. (2015). It pays to be nice, but not really nice: Asymmetric reputations from prosociality across 7 cultures. Judgment and Decision Making, 10, 355-364.
Abstract
Cultures differ in many important ways, but one trait appears to be universally valued: prosociality. For one’s reputation, around the world, it pays to be nice to others. However, recent research with American participants finds that evaluations of prosocial actions are asymmetric—relatively selfish actions are evaluated according to the magnitude of selfishness but evaluations of relatively generous actions are less sensitive to magnitude. Extremely generous actions are judged roughly as positively as modestly generous actions, but extremely selfish actions are judged much more negatively than modestly selfish actions (Klein & Epley, 2014). Here we test whether this asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality is culture-specific. Across 7 countries, 1,240 participants evaluated actors giving various amounts of money to a stranger. Along with relatively minor cross-cultural differences in evaluations of generous actions, we find cross-cultural similarities in the asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality. We discuss implications for how reputational inferences can enable the cooperation necessary for successful societies.
Journal Article
The topography of generosity: Asymmetric evaluations of prosocial actions
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Nadav Klein, Nicholas Epley
2014
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Klein, N., & Epley, N. (2014). The topography of generosity: Asymmetric evaluations of prosocial actions.Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 2366-2379.
Abstract
Prosociality is considered a virtue. Those who care for others are admired, whereas those who care only for themselves are despised. For one's reputation, it pays to be nice. Does it pay to be even nicer? Four experiments assess reputational inferences across the entire range of prosocial outcomes in zero-sum interactions, from completely selfish to completely selfless actions. We observed consistent nonlinear evaluations: Participants evaluated selfish actions more negatively than equitable actions, but they did not evaluate selfless actions markedly more favorably than equitable actions. This asymptotic pattern reflected monotonic evaluations for increasingly selfish actions and insensitivity to increasingly selfless actions. It pays to be nice but not to be really nice. Additional experiments suggest that this pattern stems partly from failing to make spontaneous comparisons between varying degrees of selflessness. We suggest that these reputational incentives could guide social norms, encouraging equitable actions but discouraging extremely selfless actions.
Journal Article
Mistakenly seeking solitude
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Nicholas Epley, Juliana Schroeder
2014
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Epley, N., & Schroeder, J. (2014). Mistakenly seeking solitude. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 1980-1999.
Abstract
Connecting with others increases happiness, but strangers in close proximity routinely ignore each other. Why? Two reasons seem likely: Either solitude is a more positive experience than interacting with strangers, or people misunderstand the consequences of distant social connections. To examine the experience of connecting to strangers, we instructed commuters on trains and buses to connect with a stranger near them, to remain disconnected, or to commute as normal (Experiments 1a and 2a). In both contexts, participants reported a more positive (and no less productive) experience when they connected than when they did not. Separate participants in each context, however, expected precisely the opposite outcome, predicting a more positive experience in solitude (Experiments 1b and 2b). This mistaken preference for solitude stems partly from underestimating others' interest in connecting (Experiments 3a and 3b), which in turn keeps people from learning the actual consequences of social interaction (Experiments 4a and 4b). The pleasure of connection seems contagious: In a laboratory waiting room, participants who were talked to had equally positive experiences as those instructed to talk (Experiment 5). Human beings are social animals. Those who misunderstand the consequences of social interactions may not, in at least some contexts, be social enough for their own well-being.
Popular Media
How Behavioral Science Can Make You a Mind Reader
The Huffington Post
Nicholas Epley
2014
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Citation
Epley, N. (June 6, 2014). How behavioral science can make you a mind reader. The Huffington Post.
Abstract
It was the perfect gift for her, without a doubt: A day spent as “trainer for a day” at the Shedd Aquarium in our hometown of Chicago. My wife loves dolphins. She would be thrilled: my gift would assure her that nobody knows, understands, and loves her like I do. She teased apart the wrapping paper, taking a minute to digest the brochure’s fine print. Anticipation bound me like a knot, and then the reaction! “Oh,” she said with a light sigh and a compassionate smile. I was wrong. Completely, painfully, surprisingly wrong. She never used the gift. Am I the only one who sometimes misunderstands those we are supposed to understand the most?
Journal Article
The mind in the machine: Anthropomorphism increases trust in an autonomous vehicle
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Adam Waytz, Joy Heafner, Nicholas Epley
2014
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Citation
Waytz, A., Heafner, J., & Epley, N. (2014). The mind in the machine: Anthropomorphism increases trust in an autonomous vehicle. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 52, 113-117.
Abstract
Sophisticated technology is increasingly replacing human minds to perform complicated tasks in domains ranging from medicine to education to transportation. We investigated an important theoretical determinant of people's willingness to trust such technology to perform competently—the extent to which a nonhuman agent is anthropomorphized with a humanlike mind—in a domain of practical importance, autonomous driving. Participants using a driving simulator drove either a normal car, an autonomous vehicle able to control steering and speed, or a comparable autonomous vehicle augmented with additional anthropomorphic features—name, gender, and voice. Behavioral, physiological, and self-report measures revealed that participants trusted that the vehicle would perform more competently as it acquired more anthropomorphic features. Technology appears better able to perform its intended design when it seems to have a humanlike mind. These results suggest meaningful consequences of humanizing technology, and also offer insights into the inverse process of objectifying humans.
Journal Article
Worth keeping but not exceeding: Asymmetric consequence of breaking versus exceeding promises.
Social Psychological and Personality Science
Ayelet Gneezy, Nicholas Epley
2014
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Gneezy, A., & Epley, N. (2014). Worth keeping but not exceeding: Asymmetric consequence of breaking versus exceeding promises. Social Psychology and Personality Science, 5, 796-804.
Abstract
Promises are social contracts that can be broken, kept, or exceeded. Breaking one's promise is evaluated more negatively than keeping one's promise. Does expending more effort to exceed a promise lead to equivalently more positive evaluations? Although linear in their outcomes, we expected an asymmetry in evaluations of broken, kept, and exceeded promises. Whereas breaking one's promise is obviously negative compared to keeping a promise, we predicted that exceeding one's promise would not be evaluated more positively than merely keeping a promise. Three sets of experiments involving hypothetical, recalled, and actual promises support these predictions. A final experiment suggests this asymmetry comes from overvaluing kept promises rather than undervaluing exceeded promises. We propse this pattern may reflect a general tendency in social systems to discourage selfishness and reward cooperation. Breaking one's promise is costly, but exceeding it does not appear worth the effort.
Book Chapter
Motivated mind perception: Treating pets as people and people as animals
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation
Nicholas Epley, Juliana Schroeder, Adam Waytz
2013
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Citation
Epley, N., Schroeder, J., & Waytz, A. (2013). Motivated mind perception: Treating pets as people and people as animals. In Gervais, S. (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 60, pp 127-152). Springer: New York.
Abstract
Human beings have a sophisticated ability to reason about the minds of others, often referred to as using one's theory of mind or mentalizing. Just like any other cognitive ability, people engage in reasoning about other minds when it seems useful for achieving particular goals, but this ability remains disengaged otherwise. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our ability to reason about the minds of others helps to explain anthropomorphism: cases in which people attribute minds to a wide range of nonhuman agents, including animals, mechanical and technological objects, and supernatural entities such as God. We suggest that engagement is guided by two basic motivations: (1) the motivation to explain and predict others' actions, and (2) the motivation to connect socially with others. When present, these motivational forces can lead people to attribute minds to almost any agent. When absent, the likelihood of attributing a mind to others, even other human beings, decreases. We suggest that understanding the factors that engage our theory of mind can help to explain the inverse process of dehumanization, and also why people might be indifferent to other people even when connecting to them would improve their momentary wellbeing.
Journal Article
Disfluency prompts analytic thinking—But not always greater accuracy: Response to Thompson et al. (2013)
Cognition
Adam L. Alter, Daniel M Oppenheimer, Nicholas Epley
2013
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Alter, A.L., Oppenheimer, D., & Epley, N. (2013). Disfluency prompts analytic thinking—But not always greater accuracy: Response to Thompson et al. (2013). Cognition, 128, 252-255.
Abstract
In this issue of Cognition, Thompson and her colleagues challenge the results from a paper we published several years ago (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). That paper demonstrated that metacognitive difficulty or disfluency can trigger more analytical thinking as measured by accuracy on several reasoning tasks. In their experiments, Thompson et al. find evidence that people process information more deeply-but not necessarily more accurately-when they experience disfluency. These results are consistent with our original theorizing, but the authors misinterpret it as counter-evidence because they suggest that accuracy (and even confidence) is a measure of deeper processing rather than a contingent outcome of such processing. We further suggest that Thompson et al. err when they discriminate between "perceptual fluency" and "answer fluency," the former of which is an element of the latter. Thompson et al. advance research by adding reaction time as a measure of deeper cognitive processing, but we caution against misinterpreting the meaning of accuracy.
Book Chapter
Anchoring
The Encyclopedia of the Mind
Nicholas Epley
2013
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Citation
Epley, N. (2013). Anchoring. In H. Pashler (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind (pp.28-30). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Abstract
It's hard to conceive of a topic of more broad and personal interest than the study of the mind. In addition to its traditional investigation by the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, the mind has also been a focus of study in the fields of philosophy, economics, anthropology, linguistics, computer science, molecular biology, education, and literature. In all these approaches, there is an almost universal fascination with how the mind works and how it affects our lives and our behavior. Studies of the mind and brain have crossed many exciting thresholds in recent years, and the study of mind now represents a thoroughly cross-disciplinary effort. Researchers from a wide range of disciplines seek answers to such questions as: What is mind? How does it ...
Book Chapter
The lesser minds problem
Are we all human? Advances in understanding[...]
Adam Waytz, Juliana Schroeder, Nicholas Epley
2013
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Citation
Waytz, A., Schroeder, J., & Epley, N. (2013). The lesser minds problem. In Bain, P., Vaes, J., & Leyens, J.P. (Eds.), Are we all human? Advances in understanding humanness and dehumanization (pp. 49-67). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Abstract
What does it mean to be human? Why do people dehumanize others (and sometimes themselves)? These questions have only recently begun to be investigated in earnest within psychology. This volume presents the latest thinking about these and related questions from research leaders in the field of humanness and dehumanization in social psychology and related disciplines. Contributions provide new insights into the history of dehumanization, its different types, and new theories are proposed for when and why dehumanization occurs. While people’s views about what humanness is, and who has it, have long been known as important in understanding ethnic conflict, contributors demonstrate its relevance in other domains, including medical practice, policing, gender relations, and our relationship with the natural environment. Cultural differences and similarities in beliefs about humanness are explored, along with strategies to overcome dehumanization. In highlighting emerging ideas and theoretical perspectives, describing current theoretical issues and controversies and ways to resolve them, and in extending research to new areas, this volume will influence research on humanness and dehumanization for many years.
Book Chapter
Imagining other minds: Hair triggered but not hare brained
Oxford Handbook of the Development of Imagination
Adam Waytz, Nadav Klein, Nicholas Epley
2013
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Citation
Waytz, A., Klein, N., & Epley, N. (2013). Imagining other minds: Hair triggered but not hare brained. In Marjorie Taylor (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Development of Imagination (pp. 272-287). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Abstract
Nonhuman agents are sometimes attributed humanlike characteristics, particularly mental states of thoughts, feelings, intentions, and conscious experience. Because such anthropomorphism emerges early in life and continues through adulthood in at least some cultures, it may appear to be an innate and automatic phenomenon. However, the psychological processes that enable people to reason about the minds of others suggests that such inferences require cognitive effort and motivation, meaning that anthropomorphism arises only when triggered by one's goals or the situational context to consider the mind of another agent. These triggers identify important moderators of anthropomorphism in adulthood, providing insight into when people are likely to attribute humanlike minds to nonhuman agents and when they are not.
Journal Article
Exaggerated, mispredicted, and misplaced: When "it's the thought that counts" in gift exchanges
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Yan Zhang, Nicholas Epley
2012
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Citation
Zhang, Y., & Epley, N. (2012). Exaggerated, mispredicted, and misplaced: When "it's the thought that counts" in gift exchanges. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 667-681.
Abstract
Gift-giving involves both the objective value of a gift and the symbolic meaning of the exchange. The objective value is sometimes considered of secondary importance as when people claim, "It's the thought that counts." We evaluated when and how mental state inferences count in gift exchanges. Because considering another's thoughts requires motivation and deliberation, we predicted gift givers' thoughts would increase receivers' appreciation only when triggered to consider a giver's thoughts, such as when a friend gives a bad gift. Because gift givers do not experience this trigger, we expected they would mispredict when their thoughts count and when they do not. Three experiments support these predictions. A final experiment demonstrated that thoughts "count" for givers by increasing social connection to the receiver. These results suggest that mental state inferences are not automatic in social interactions and that inferences about how much thoughts count are systematically miscalibrated.
Journal Article
Social connection enables dehumanization
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Adam Waytz, Nicholas Epley
2012
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Waytz, A., & Epley, N. (2012). Social connection enables dehumanization. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 70-76.
Abstract
Being socially connected has considerable benefits for oneself, but may have negative consequences for evaluations of others. In particular, being socially connected to close others satisfies the need for social connection, and creates disconnection from more distant others. We therefore predicted that feeling socially connected would increase the tendency to dehumanize more socially distant others. Four experiments support this prediction. Those led to feel socially connected were less likely to attribute humanlike mental states to members of various social groups (Experiments 1 and 2), particularly distant others compared to close others (Experiment 3), and were also more likely to recommend harsh treatment for dehumanized others (i.e., terrorist detainees, Experiment 4). Discussion addresses the mechanisms by which social connection enables dehumanization, and the varied behavioral implications that result.
Journal Article
Integrations need both breadth and depth: Commentary on Zaki and Ochsner
Psychological Inquiry
Nicholas Epley, Tal Eyal
2011
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Citation
Epley, N., & Eyal, T. (2011). Integrations need both breadth and depth. Psychological Inquiry, 22, 187-192.
Abstract
Zaki and Ochsner (this issue) put out a call for social cognition researchers to integrate work on the processes that enable mind perception with work on the
accuracy with which people reason about other minds.
We welcome this call and believe it is long overdue. Indeed, the main reason that psychologists are interested
in underlying psychological processes at all is because
they give insight into how effectively these processes
are likely to function in everyday life. Understanding
how people reason about the minds of others is interesting mainly because it provides insight into how well
they are likely to do so.
Popular Media
Let's make some Metra noise
The Chicago Tribune
Nicholas Epley, Juliana Schroeder
2011
Abstract
Everyone wants a little more peace and quiet. Monday, Metra begins offering some in the form of "quiet cars" on all trains. Talking on cellphones and to fellow commuters is discouraged. Sounds great, doesn't it? Indeed, Metra reports that 84 percent of people who responded to a survey were in favor of these cars. We found the same thing in an experiment that asked Chicagoans to predict how much they would enjoy different kinds of commutes. In the experiment, people predicted they would find a commute where they sat alone and enjoyed their solitude more pleasant than one where they were asked to strike up a conversation with a fellow passenger. Could these people be wrong? We think so.
Journal Article
The closeness-communication bias: Increased egocentrism among friends versus strangers
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Kenneth Savitsky, Boaz Keysar, Nicholas Epley, Travis Carter, Ashley Swanson
2011
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Citation
Savitsky, K., Keysar, B., Epley, N., Carter, T., & Sawnson, A. (2011). The Closeness-Communication Bias: Increased egocentrism among friends versus strangers. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 269-273.
Abstract
People commonly believe that they communicate better with close friends than with strangers. We propose, however, that closeness can lead people to overestimate how well they communicate, a phenomenon we term the closeness-communication bias. In one experiment, participants who followed direction of a friend were more likely to make egocentric errors—look at and reach for an object only they could see—than were those who followed direction of a stranger. In two additional experiments, participants who attempted to convey particular meanings with ambiguous phrases overestimated their success more when communicating with a friend or spouse than with strangers. We argue that people engage in active monitoring of strangers’ divergent perspectives because they know they must, but that they “let down their guard” and rely more on their own perspective when they communicate with a friend.
Journal Article
Making sense by making sentient: Effectance motivation increases anthropomorphism
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Adam Waytz, Carey K. Morewedge, Nicholas Epley, George Monteleone, Jia-Hong Gao, John T. Cacioppo
2010
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Citation
Waytz, A., Morewedge, C., Epley, N., Monteleone, G., Gao, J., & Cacioppo, J.T. (2010). Making sense by making sentient: Effectance motivation increases anthropomorphism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 410-435.
Abstract
People commonly anthropomorphize nonhuman agents, imbuing everything from computers to pets to gods with humanlike capacities and mental experiences. Although widely observed, the determinants of anthropomorphism are poorly understood and rarely investigated. We propose that people anthropomorphize, in part, to satisfy effectance motivation-the basic and chronic motivation to attain mastery of one's environment. Five studies demonstrated that increasing effectance motivation by manipulating the perceived unpredictability of a nonhuman agent or by increasing the incentives for mastery increases anthropomorphism. Neuroimaging data demonstrated that the neural correlates of this process are similar to those engaged when mentalizing other humans. A final study demonstrated that anthropomorphizing a stimulus makes it appear more predictable and understandable, suggesting that anthropomorphism satisfies effectance motivation. Anthropomorphizing nonhuman agents seems to satisfy the basic motivation to make sense of an otherwise uncertain environment.
Journal Article
Causes and consequences of mind perception
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Adam Waytz, Kurt Gray, Nicholas Epley, Daniel M. Wenger
2010
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Citation
Waytz, A., Gray, K., Epley, N., & Wegner, D.M. (2010). The causes and consequences of mind perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 383-388.
Abstract
Perceiving others' minds is a crucial component of social life. People do not, however, always ascribe minds to other people, and sometimes ascribe minds to non-people (e.g. God, gadgets). This article reviews when mind perception occurs, when it does not, and why mind perception is important. Causes of mind perception stem both from the perceiver and perceived, and include the need for social connection (perceiver) and a similarity to oneself (perceived). Mind perception also has profound consequences for both the perceiver and perceived. Ascribing mind confers an entity moral rights and also makes its actions meaningful. Understanding the causes and consequences of mind perception can explain when this most social of cognitive skills will be used, and why it matters.
Journal Article
The intentional mind and the hot hand: Perceiving intentions makes streaks seem likely to continue
Cognition
Eugene M. Caruso, Adam Waytz, Nicholas Epley
2010
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Caruso, E.M., Waytz, A., & Epley, N. (2010). The intentional mind and the hot hand: Perceiving intentions makes streaks seem likely to continue. Cognition, 116, 149-153.
Abstract
People can appear inconsistent in their intuitions about sequences of repeated events. Sometimes people believe such sequences will continue (the "hot hand"), and sometimes people believe they will reverse (the "gambler's fallacy"). These contradictory intuitions can be partly explained by considering the perceived intentionality of the agent generating the streak. The intuition that streaks will continue (reverse) should emerge in contexts involving agents that are perceived to be intentional (unintentional), and should be most common among those who are most inclined to attribute intentions to other agents. Four studies support these predictions, identifying both situational and dispositional determinants of the perceived continuity of streaks. Discussion focuses on the foundational nature of intentionality for perceptions of interdependence between events, the relationship between these findings and existing theoretical accounts, and the inverse possibility that people use perceptions of streakiness as a cue for an agent's intentionality.
Journal Article
Who sees human?: The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism
Perspectives in Psychological Sciences
Adam Waytz, John Cacioppo, Nicholas Epley
2010
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Citation
Waytz, A., Cacioppo, J.T., & Epley, N. (2010). Who sees human? The stability and importance of individual differences in anthropomorphism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5, 219-232.
Abstract
Anthropomorphism is a far-reaching phenomenon that incorporates ideas from social psychology, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and the neurosciences. Although commonly considered to be a relatively universal phenomenon with only limited importance in modern industrialized societies—more cute than critical—our research suggests precisely the opposite. In particular, we provide a measure of stable individual differences in anthropomorphism that predicts three important consequences for everyday life. This research demonstrates that individual differences in anthropomorphism predict the degree of moral care and concern afforded to an agent, the amount of responsibility and trust placed on an agent, and the extent to which an agent serves as a source of social influence on the self. These consequences have implications for disciplines outside of psychology including human–computer interaction, business (marketing and finance), and law. Concluding discussion addresses how understanding anthropomorphism not only informs the burgeoning study of nonpersons, but how it informs classic issues underlying person perception as well.
Journal Article
Reflexively mindblind: Using Theory of Mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Shuhong Lin, Boaz Keysar, Nicholas Epley
2010
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Lin, S., Keysar, B., & Epley, N. (2010). Reflexively mindblind: Using Theory of Mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 551-556.
Abstract
People commonly interpret others’ behavior in terms of the actors’ underlying beliefs, knowledge, or other mental states, thereby using their “theory of mind.” Two experiments suggest that using one’s theory of mind is a relatively effortful process. In both experiments, people reflexively used their own knowledge and beliefs to follow a speaker’s instruction, but only effortfully used their theory of mind to take into account a speaker’s intention to interpret those instructions. In Experiment 1, people with lower working memory capacity were less effective than people with larger working memory capacity in applying their theory of mind to interpret behavior. In Experiment 2, an attention-demanding secondary task reduced people’s ability to apply their theory of mind. People appear to be reflexively mindblind, interpreting behavior in terms of the actor’s mental states only to the extent that they have the cognitive resources to do so.
Journal Article
How to seem telepathic: Enabling mind reading by matching self-construal
Psychological Science
Tal Eyal, Nicholas Epley
2010
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Eyal, T., & Epley, N. (2010). How to seem telepathic: Enabling mind reading by matching self-construal. Psychological Science, 21, 700-705.
Abstract
People can have difficulty intuiting what others think about them at least partly because people evaluate themselves in more fine-grained detail than observers do. This mismatch in the level of detail at which people construe themselves versus others diminishes accuracy in social judgment. Being a more accurate mind reader requires thinking of oneself at a higher level of construal that matches the observer's construal (Experiments 1 and 2), and this strategy is more effective in this context than perspective taking (Experiments 3a and 3b). Accurately intuiting how others evaluate themselves requires the opposite strategy-thinking about others in a lower level of construal that matches the way people evaluate themselves (Experiment 4). Accurately reading other minds to know how one is evaluated by others-or how others evaluate themselves-requires focusing one's evaluative lens at the right level of detail.
Journal Article
Social cognition unbound: Insights into anthropomorphism and dehumanization
Current Directions in Psychological Science
Adam Waytz, Nicholas Epley, John T. Cacioppo
2010
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Citation
Waytz, A., Epley, N., & Cacioppo, J.T. (2010). Social cognition unbound: Insights into anthropomorphism and dehumanization. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19, 58-62.
Abstract
People conceive of wrathful gods, fickle computers, and selfish genes, attributing human characteristics to a variety of supernatural, technological, and biological agents. This tendency to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents figures prominently in domains ranging from religion to marketing to computer science. Perceiving an agent to be humanlike has important implications for whether the agent is capable of social influence, accountable for its actions, and worthy of moral care and consideration. Three primary factors—elicited agent knowledge, sociality motivation, and effectance motivation—appear to account for a significant amount of variability in anthropomorphism. Identifying these factors that lead people to see nonhuman agents as humanlike also sheds light on the inverse process of dehumanization, whereby people treat human agents as animals or objects. Understanding anthropomorphism can contribute to a more expansive view of social cognition that applies social psychological theory to a wide variety of both human and nonhuman agents.
Book Chapter
Mind perception
The Handbook of Social Psychology
Nicholas Epley, Adam Waytz
2010
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Citation
Epley, N., & Waytz, A. (2010). Mind Perception. In S.T. Fiske, D.T. Gilbert, & G. Lindsay (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology (5th ed., pp. 498-541). New York: Wiley.
Abstract
The Encyclopedia of Human Relationships offers an interdisciplinary view of all types of human associations—friends, lovers, spouses, roommates, coworkers, teammates, parents and children, cousins, siblings, acquaintances, neighbors, business associates, and so forth. Although each of these connections is unique in some respect, they share a common core of principles and processes. These three volumes provide a state-of-the-art review of the extensive theories, concepts, and empirical findings about human relationships.
Journal Article
Anchoring unbound
Journal of Consumer Psychology
Nicholas Epley, Thomas Gilovich
2010
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Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2010). Anchoring unbound. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20, 20-24.
Abstract
An attitudes and persuasion perspective can broaden our understanding of anchoring by highlighting sources of variability in anchoring effects that have been largely overlooked. As the target article suggests, research guided by this perspective can help identify (1) different types of anchors that exert their influence through different underlying mechanisms, 2) important social psychological moderators of anchoring effects, and 3) sources of variability in the consequences of anchoring for judgment and choice. In this commentary, we take an even broader perspective on the types of anchors that are likely to influence judgment, suggesting four potentially distinct types—intuitive approximations, best/worst case scenarios, environmental suggestions, and magnitude priming. We conclude by discussing how an attitudes and persuasion perspective on anchoring may provide novel insights into the moderators and consequences of anchoring effects in everyday life.
Journal Article
Believers’ estimates of God’s beliefs are more egocentric than estimates of other people’s beliefs
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Nicholas Epley, Benjamin A. Converse, Alexa Delbosc, George A. Monteleone, John T. Cacioppo
2009
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Epley, N., Converse, B.A., Delbosc, A., Monteleone, G., & Cacioppo, J. (2009). Believers’ estimates of God’s beliefs are more egocentric than estimates of other people’s beliefs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 21533-21538.
Abstract
People often reason egocentrically about others' beliefs, using their own beliefs as an inductive guide. Correlational, experimental, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that people may be even more egocentric when reasoning about a religious agent's beliefs (e.g., God). In both nationally representative and more local samples, people's own beliefs on important social and ethical issues were consistently correlated more strongly with estimates of God's beliefs than with estimates of other people's beliefs (Studies 1-4). Manipulating people's beliefs similarly influenced estimates of God's beliefs but did not as consistently influence estimates of other people's beliefs (Studies 5 and 6). A final neuroimaging study demonstrated a clear convergence in neural activity when reasoning about one's own beliefs and God's beliefs, but clear divergences when reasoning about another person's beliefs (Study 7). In particular, reasoning about God's beliefs activated areas associated with self-referential thinking more so than did reasoning about another person's beliefs. Believers commonly use inferences about God's beliefs as a moral compass, but that compass appears especially dependent on one's own existing beliefs.
Journal Article
Self-centered social exchange: Differential use of costs versus benefits in prosocial reciprocity
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Yan Zhang, Nicholas Epley
2009
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Zhang, Y., & Epley, N. (2009). Self-centered social exchange: Differential use of costs versus benefits in prosocial reciprocity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 796-810.
Abstract
Maintaining equitable social relations often requires reciprocating "in kind" for others' prosocial favors. Such in-kind reciprocity requires assessing the value of a prosocial action, an assessment that can lead to egocentric biases in perceived value between favor givers versus favor receivers. In any prosocial exchange, 1 person (the giver) incurs a cost to provide a benefit for another person (the receiver). Six experiments suggest that givers may attend more to the costs they incur in performing a prosocial act than do receivers, who tend to focus relatively more on the benefits they receive. Givers may therefore expect to be reciprocated on the basis of the costs they incur, whereas receivers actually reciprocate primarily on the basis of the benefit they receive. This research identifies 1 challenge to maintaining a sense of equity in social relations and predicts when people are likely to feel fairly versus unfairly valued in their relationships.
Journal Article
When the best appears to be saved for last: Serial position effects in choice
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Ye Li, Nicholas Epley
2009
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Li, Y., & Epley, N. (2009). When the best appears to be saved for last: Serial position effects in choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22, 378-389.
Abstract
Decision-makers often evaluate options sequentially due to constraints on attention, timing, or physical location of the options. Choosing the best option will therefore often depend on people's memories of the options. Because imperfect recall introduces uncertainty in earlier options, judgments of those options should regress toward the category mean as memory decays over time. Relatively desirable options will therefore tend to seem less desirable with time, and relatively undesirable options will tend to seem less undesirable with time. We therefore predicted that people will tend to select the first option in a set when choosing between generally undesirable options, and will tend to select the last when choosing between generally desirable options. We demonstrate these serial position effects in choices among paintings, American Idol audition clips, jellybeans, and female faces, provide evidence of its underlying mechanism, and explain how these findings build on existing accounts.
Journal Article
Science and God: An automatic opposition between ultimate explanations
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Jesse Preston, Nicholas Epley
2009
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Citation
Preston, J., & Epley, N. (2009). Science and God: An automatic opposition between ultimate explanations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 238-241.
Abstract
Science and religion have come into conflict repeatedly throughout history, and one simple reason for this is the two offer competing explanations for many of the same phenomena. We present evidence that the conflict between these two concepts can occur automatically, such that increasing the perceived value of one decreases the automatic evaluation of the other. In Experiment 1, scientific theories described as poor explanations decreased automatic evaluations of science, but simultaneously increased automatic evaluations of God. In Experiment 2, using God as an explanation increased automatic evaluations of God, but decreased automatic evaluations of science. Religion and science both have the potential to be ultimate explanations, and these findings suggest that this competition for explanatory space can create an automatic opposition in evaluations.
Book Chapter
Perspective taking
Encyclopedia of Human Relationships
Nicholas Epley, Adam Waytz
2009
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Citation
Epley, N., & Waytz, A. (2009). Perspective Taking. In Harry T. Reis & Susan Sprecher (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Human Relationships (Vol. 3, pp. 1228-1231). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Abstract
Perspective taking describes a person's attempt to understand a stimulus from a different point of view. In relationships, perspective taking typically describes one person's attempt to understand a relationship partner's mental representations—his or her thoughts, feelings, attitudes, beliefs, preferences, or evaluations. Perspective taking is a broad term that is generally used to describe conscious and deliberate attempts to infer other people's mental states. Perspective taking can lead to empathy, whereby a person directly experiences another's emotional state or can induce people to experience emotions about another person's experience, such as pride or sympathy.
Journal Article
In the mood to get over yourself: Mood affects theory-of-mind use
Emotion
Benjamin A. Converse, Shuhong Lin, Boaz Keysar, Nicholas Epley
2008
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Citation
Converse, B. A., Lin, S., Keysar, B., & Epley, N. (2008). In the mood to get over yourself: Mood affects theory-of-mind use. Emotion, 8, 725-730.
Abstract
Understanding others' behavior often involves attributing mental states to them by using one's "theory of mind." We argue that using theory of mind to recognize differences between one's own perspective and another's perspective is a deliberate process of inference that may be influenced by incidental mood. Because sadness is associated with more systematic and deliberate processing whereas happiness is associated with more heuristic processing, we predicted that theory-of-mind use would be facilitated by sadness compared with happiness. Two experiments supported this prediction, demonstrating that participants were more likely to utilize knowledge about others to make inferences about their mental states when they were induced to feel sad than when they were induced to feel happy. These results provide both theoretical insight into the psychological mechanisms that govern theory of mind as well as practical insight into a common source of variability in its use.
Journal Article
Mirror, mirror on the wall: Enhancement in self-recognition
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Nicholas Epley, Erin Whitchurch
2008
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Epley, N., & Whitchurch, E. (2008). Mirror, mirror on the wall: Enhancement in self-recognition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 1159-1170.
Abstract
People's inferences about their own traits and abilities are often enhancing. A series of experiments suggests that this enhancement extends to more automatic and perceptual judgments as well, such that people recognize their own faces as being more physically attractive than they actually are. In each experiment, participants' faces were made more or less attractive using a morphing procedure. Participants were more likely to recognize an attractively enhanced version of their own face out of a lineup as their own, and they identified an attractively enhanced version of their face more quickly in a lineup of distractor faces. This enhancement bias occurred for both one's own face and a friend's face but not for a relative stranger's face. Such enhancement was correlated with implicit measures of self-worth but not with explicit measures, consistent with this variety of enhancement being a relatively automatic rather than deliberative process.
Journal Article
Knowing too much: Using private knowledge to predict how one is viewed by others
Psychological Science
John R. Chambers, Nicholas Epley, Kenneth Savitsky, Paul D. Windschitl
2008
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Chambers, J. R., Epley, N., Savitsky, K., & Windschitl, P. D. (2008). Knowing too much: Using private knowledge to predict how one is viewed by others. Psychological Science, 19, 542-548.
Abstract
People have more information about themselves than others do, and this fundamental asymmetry can help to explain why individuals have difficulty accurately intuiting how they appear to other people. Determining how one appears to observers requires one to utilize public information that is available to observers, but to disregard private information that they do not possess. We report a series of experiments, however, showing that people utilize privately known information about their own past performance (Experiments 1 and 2), the performance of other people (Experiment 3), and imaginary performance (Experiment 4) when intuiting how they are viewed by others. This tendency can help explain why people's beliefs about how they are judged by others often diverge from how they are actually judged.
Journal Article
Solving the (real) other minds problem
Social and Personality Psychology Compass
Nicholas Epley
2008
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Epley, N. (2008). Solving the (real) other minds problem. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 1455-1474.
Abstract
People care about others’ thoughts, feelings, and intentions but can have considerable difficulty reading others’ minds accurately. Recent advances in understanding how people make such inferences provide significant insight into when people are likely to be reasonably accurate mind readers and when they are not. People tend to reason about others’ mental states by starting with their own and only subsequently adjusting that egocentric default to accommodate differences between themselves and others. Such adjustments tend to be insufficient, rendering final estimates egocentrically biased. When more information about others is available, people tend to rely on existing stereotypes or other expectations to intuit others’ mental states. Systematic errors resulting either from excessive egocentrism or inaccurate expectations can lead to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and social conflict, but these biases also suggest useful strategies for improving mind reading in everyday life.
Journal Article
When we need a human: Motivational determinants of anthropomorphism
Social Cognition
Nicholas Epley, Adam Waytz, Scott Akalis, John T. Cacioppo
2008
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Citation
Epley, N., Waytz, A., Akalis, S., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). When we need a human: Motivational determinants of anthropomorphism. Social Cognition, 26, 143-155.
Abstract
We propose that the tendency to anthropomorphize nonhuman agents is determined primarily by three factors (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007), two of which we test here: sociality motivation and effectance motivation. This theory makes unique predictions about dispositional, situational, cultural, and developmental variability in anthropomorphism, and we test two predictions about dispositional and situational influences stemming from both of these motivations. In particular, we test whether those who are dispositionally lonely (sociality motivation) are more likely to anthropomorphize well-known pets (Study 1), and whether those who have a stable need for control (effectance motivation) are more likely to anthropomorphize apparently unpredictable animals (Study 2). Both studies are consistent with our predictions. We suggest that this theory of anthropomorphism can help to explain when people are likely to attribute humanlike traits to nonhuman agents, and provides insight into the inverse process of dehumanization in which people fail to attribute human characteristics to other humans.
Popular Media
Rebate psychology
The New York Times
Nicholas Epley
2008
Abstract
THE House of Representatives passed a bill on Tuesday that would try to stimulate the economy, in part, by sending “tax rebates” to more than 100 million families. The logic of a tax rebate is that people will spend more money if they have more to spend. Unfortunately, psychology may interfere with that logic.
Journal Article
Reciprocity is not give and take: Asymmetric reciprocity to positive and negative acts
Psychological Science
Boaz Keysar, Benjamin A. Converse, Jiunwen Wang, Nicholas Epley
2008
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Citation
Keysar, B., Converse, B.A., Wang, J., & Epley, N. (2008). Reciprocity is not give and take: Asymmetric reciprocity to positive and negative acts. Psychological Science, 19, 1280-1286.
Abstract
Unlike economic exchange, social exchange has no well-defined "value." It is based on the norm of reciprocity, in which giving and taking are to be repaid in equivalent measure. Although giving and taking are colloquially assumed to be equivalent actions, we demonstrate that they produce different patterns of reciprocity. In five experiments utilizing a dictator game, people reciprocated in like measure to apparently prosocial acts of giving, but reciprocated more selfishly to apparently antisocial acts of taking, even when the objective outcomes of the acts of giving and taking were identical. Additional results demonstrate that acts of giving in social exchanges are perceived as more generous than objectively identical acts of taking, that taking tends to escalate, and that the asymmetry in reciprocity is not due to gaining versus losing resources. Reciprocity appears to operate on an exchange rate that assigns value to the meaning of events, in a fashion that encourages prosocial exchanges.
Journal Article
Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: Loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds.
Psychological Science
Nicholas Epley, Scott Akalis, Adam Waytz, John T. Cacioppo
2008
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Citation
Epley, N., Akalis, S., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2008). Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: Loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds. Psychological Science, 19, 114-120.
Abstract
People are motivated to maintain social connection with others, and those who lack social connection with other humans may try to compensate by creating a sense of human connection with nonhuman agents. This may occur in at least two ways—by anthropomorphizing nonhuman agents such as nonhuman animals and gadgets to make them appear more humanlike and by increasing belief in commonly anthropomorphized religious agents (such as God). Three studies support these hypotheses both among individuals who are chronically lonely (Study 1) and among those who are induced to feel lonely (Studies 2 and 3). Additional findings suggest that such results are not simply produced by any negative affective state (Study
3). These results have important implications not only for understanding when people are likely to treat nonhuman agents as humanlike (anthropomorphism), but also for understanding when people treat human agents as nonhuman (dehumanization).
Book Chapter
Perspective taking: Misstepping into others' shoes
The handbook of imagination and mental simulation
Nicholas Epley, Eugene M. Caruso
2008
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Citation
Epley, N., & Caruso, E. M. (2008). Perspective taking: Misstepping into others' shoes. In K. D. Markman, W. M. P. Klein, & J. A. Suhr (Eds.), The handbook of imagination and mental simulation (pp. 295-309). New York: Psychology Press.
Abstract
The ability to intuit another person's thoughts, feelings, and inner mental states is surely among the most impressive of human mental faculties. Adopting another's perspective requires the ability to represent the self as distinct from others, the development of a theory of mind to realize that others have mental states in the first place, and the explicit recognition that others' mental states and perceptions could differ from one's own. Understanding how perspective taking operates in everyday social life requires both a consideration of the impressive strengths of this mental ability as well as a recognition of its weaknesses. There is no question that humans are capable of adopting others' perspectives and that doing so can increase social coordination, cooperation, and even psychological altruism. Discussions of such desirable consequences of perspective taking in social interaction are numerous. Our treatment is decidedly less flattering, however, and considers in more detail the barriers that keep people from using their perspective-taking ability to its full potential. That considering another's perspective is difficult and less than perfect will be a surprise to none, but to understand why it is less than perfect and what one might do to improve the accuracy of this ability in everyday life requires an appreciation of the major barriers that keep people from using their potential abilities more completely. We believe there are three critical barriers—activating the ability, adjusting an egocentric default, and accessing accurate information about others.
Book Chapter
Egocentrism
The Encyclopedia of Educational Psychology
Benjamin A. Converse, Nicholas Epley
2008
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Citation
Converse, B., & Epley, N. (2008). Egocentrism. In N. Salkind, & K. Rasmussen (Eds.), The Encyclopedia of Educational Psychology (pp 327-328). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Abstract
A child playing hide-and-seek runs to the corner of the room and covers her eyes with a pillow while her father counts to 10, believing that if she cannot see her father, then her father cannot see her. A thirsty grocery shopper spends more money than usual on bottled water and decides not to buy the salty pretzels that are on his shopping list. Political conservatives responding to an Internet poll estimate that there are more like-minded conservatives in the population than political liberals. All of these people are reasoning egocentrically. That is, they are all reasoning about the world from their own current perspectives. In the first place, people process incoming information from their own perspective. Then, they extrapolate in two ways: temporally, extending present knowledge to the past and future; and socially, extending self knowledge to others. Education involves acquiring knowledge and communicating that knowledge to others, and egocentric bias in judgment is therefore a central—but easily overlooked—issue for educators.
Journal Article
Unfixed resources: Perceived costs, consumption, and the accessible account effect
Journal of Consumer Research
Carey K. Morewedge, Leif Holtzman, Nicholas Epley
2007
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Citation
Morewedge, C., Holtzman, L. & Epley, N. (2007). Unfixed resources: Perceived costs, consumption, and the accessible account effect. Journal of Consumer Research, 34, 459-467.
Abstract
Consumption depletes one's available resources, but consumers may be unaware of the total resources available for consumption and, therefore, be influenced by the temporary accessibility of resource accounts. Consistent with this possibility, consumers in four experiments perceived a unit of consumption to be smaller and consequently consumed more, when large resource accounts of money, calories, or time (e.g., the money in their savings account) were made temporarily accessible compared with when small resource accounts were made temporarily accessible (e.g., the money in their wallet). Manipulating the cognitive accessibility of resources available for consumption influences both subjective judgment and behavior.
Journal Article
Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytical thought
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Adam L. Alter, Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Nicholas Epley, Rebecca N. Eyre
2007
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Citation
Alter, A., Oppenheimer, D., Epley, N., & Eyre, R. (2007). Overcoming intuition: Metacognitive difficulty activates analytical thought. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 569-576.
Abstract
Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency--receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments 1 and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing one's brow (Experiment 3)--reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments 1 and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.
Journal Article
On Seeing Human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism
Psychological Review
Nicholas Epley, Adam Waytz, John T. Cacioppo
2007
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Citation
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On Seeing Human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114, 864-886.
Abstract
Anthropomorphism describes the tendency to imbue the real or imagined behavior of nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions. Although surprisingly common, anthropomorphism is not invariant. This article describes a theory to explain when people are likely to anthropomorphize and when they are not, focused on three psychological determinants--the accessibility and applicability of anthropocentric knowledge (elicited agent knowledge), the motivation to explain and understand the behavior of other agents (effectance motivation), and the desire for social contact and affiliation (sociality motivation). This theory predicts that people are more likely to anthropomorphize when anthropocentric knowledge is accessible and applicable, when motivated to be effective social agents, and when lacking a sense of social connection to other humans. These factors help to explain why anthropomorphism is so variable; organize diverse research; and offer testable predictions about dispositional, situational, developmental, and cultural influences on anthropomorphism. Discussion addresses extensions of this theory into the specific psychological processes underlying anthropomorphism, applications of this theory into robotics and human-computer interaction, and the insights offered by this theory into the inverse process of dehumanization.
Journal Article
The framing of financial windfalls and implications for public policy
The Journal of Socio-Economics
Nicholas Epley, Ayelet Gneezy
2007
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Citation
Epley, N., & Gneezy, A. (2007). The framing of financial windfalls and implications for public policy. Journal of Socio-economics, 36, 36-47.
Abstract
Governments, employers, and companies provide financial windfalls to individuals with some regularity. Recent evidence suggests that the framing (or description) of these windfalls can dramatically influence their consumption. In particular, income described as a positive departure from the status quo (e.g., as a bonus) is more readily spent than objectively identical income described as a return to the status quo (e.g., as a rebate). Such findings are consistent with psychological accounts of decision making and should supplement existing economic models. These results have important implications for the marketing of such windfalls, and discussion focuses particularly on implications for government tax policies.
Book Chapter
Prospect theory
Encyclopedia of Social Psychology
Ayelet Gneezy, Nicholas Epley
2007
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Citation
Gneezy, A., & Epley, N. (2007). Prospect Theory. In R. Baumeister, & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Social Psychology (Vol. 2, 711-714). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Abstract
Prospect Theory is a psychological account that describes how people make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty. These may involve decisions about nearly
anything where the outcome of the decision is somewhat risky or uncertain, from
deciding whether or not to buy a lottery ticket, to marry one’s current romantic partner, to
undergo chemotherapy treatment, or to invest in life insurance.
Book Chapter
Base rate fallacy
Encyclopedia of Social Psychology
Nicholas Epley
2007
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Citation
Epley, N. (2007). Base rate fallacy. In R. Baumeister, & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Social Psychology(Vol. 1, pp. 102-103). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Abstract
Imagine that you meet Tom one evening at a party. He is somewhat shy and reserved, is very analytical, and enjoys reading science fiction novels. What is the likelihood that Tom works as a computer scientist? The answer depends on both the knowledge you have about Tom and the number of computer scientists that exist in the population. Tom fits the stereotype of a computer scientist, but there are relatively few computer scientists in the general population compared to all other occupations. The knowledge you have about Tom is often called individuating or case-based information, whereas knowledge about the number of computer scientists in the general population is often called distributional or base rate information. When presented with both pieces of information—be it when judging the risk of contracting a disease, when judging the likelihood of a defendant's guilt, or when predicting the likelihood of future events—people often base their judgments too heavily on case-based or individuating information and underutilize or completely ignore distributional or base-rate evidence. Underutilizing or ignoring base-rate evidence in intuitive judgments and decision making is known as the base rate fallacy.
Journal Article
The costs and benefits of undoing egocentric responsibility assessments in groups
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Eugene M. Caruso, Nicholas Epley, Max H. Bazerman
2006
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Citation
Caruso, E.M., Epley, N., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). The costs and benefits of undoing egocentric responsibility assessments in groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 857-871.
Abstract
Individuals working in groups often egocentrically believe they have contributed more of the total work than is logically possible. Actively considering others' contributions effectively reduces these egocentric assessments, but this research suggests that undoing egocentric biases in groups may have some unexpected costs. Four experiments demonstrate that members who contributed much to the group outcome are actually less satisfied and less interested in future collaborations after considering others' contributions compared with those who contributed little. This was especially true in cooperative groups. Egocentric biases in responsibility allocation can create conflict, but this research suggests that undoing these biases can have some unfortunate consequences. Some members who look beyond their own perspective may not like what they see.
Journal Article
Bonus or Rebate?: The impact of income framing on spending and saving
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Nicholas Epley, Dennis Mak, Lorraine Chen Idson
2006
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Citation
Epley, N., Mak, D., & Idson, L. (2006). Bonus or Rebate?: The impact of income framing on spending and saving. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 213-227.
Abstract
All income increases a person's absolute wealth, but consumption decisions may be based more heavily on perceived changes in wealth. Change is computed by comparing a current state with a former state, and we predicted that people would be more likely to spend income framed as a gain from a current wealth state than income framed as a return to a prior state. Four experiments confirmed this prediction on people's memory for spending of a government tax rebate (Experiment 1), on unobtrusive self-report measures of spending an unexpected windfall (Experiments 2 and 3), and on actual spending on items for sale in a laboratory experiment (Experiment 4). These results can be explained, at least in part, by the reference points implied in the framing of income (follow-ups to Experiments 1 and 4). Discussion focuses on implications for the consumption of other commodities, assessments of risk, and government tax policies.
Journal Article
The mixed blessings of self-knowledge in behavioral prediction: Enhanced discrimination but exacerbated bias
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Nicholas Epley, David Dunning
2006
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Citation
Epley, N., & Dunning, D. (2006). The mixed blessings of self-knowledge in behavioral prediction: Enhanced discrimination but exacerbated bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 641-655.
Abstract
Four experiments demonstrate that self-knowledge provides a mixed blessing in behavioral prediction, depending on how accuracy is measured. Compared with predictions of others, self-knowledge tends to decrease overall accuracy by increasing bias (the mean difference between predicted behavior and reality) but tends to increase overall accuracy by also enhancing discrimination (the correlation between predicted behavior and reality). Overall, participants' self-predictions overestimated the likelihood that they would engage in desirable behaviors (bias), whereas peer predictions were relatively unbiased. However, self-predictions also were more strongly correlated with individual differences in actual behavior (discrimination) than were peer predictions. Discussion addresses the costs and benefits of self-knowledge in behavioral prediction and the broader implications of measuring judgmental accuracy of judgment in terms of bias versus discrimination.
Journal Article
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic: Why adjustments are insufficient.
Psychological Science
Nicholas Epley, Thomas Gilovich
2006
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Citation
Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2006). The anchoring and adjustment heuristic: Why adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science,17, 311-318.
Abstract
One way to make judgments under uncertainty is to anchor on information that comes to mind and adjust until a plausible estimate is reached. This anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic is assumed to underlie many intuitive judgments, and insufficient adjustment is commonly invoked to explain judgmental biases. However, despite extensive research on anchoring effects, evidence for adjustment-based anchoring biases has only recently been provided, and the causes of insufficient adjustment remain unclear. This research was designed to identify the origins of insufficient adjustment. The results of two sets of experiments indicate that adjustments from self-generated anchor values tend to be insufficient because they terminate once a plausible value is reached (Studies 1a and 1b) unless one is able and willing to search for a more accurate estimate (Studies 2a-2c).
Journal Article
When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive Egoism in social interaction
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Nicholas Epley, Eugene M. Caruso, Max H. Bazerman
2006
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Citation
Epley, N., Caruso, E.M., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive Egoism in social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 872-889.
Abstract
Group members often reason egocentrically, believing that they deserve more than their fair share of group resources. Leading people to consider other members’ thoughts and perspectives can reduce these egocentric (self-centered) judgments such that people claim that it is fair for them to take less; however, the consideration of others’ thoughts and perspectives actually increases egoistic (selfish) behavior such that people actually take more of available resources. A series of experiments demonstrates this pattern in competitive contexts in which considering others’ perspectives activates egoistic theories of their likely behavior, leading people to counter by behaving more egoistically themselves. This reactive egoism is attenuated in cooperative contexts. Discussion focuses on the implications of reactive egoism in social interaction and on strategies for alleviating its potentially deleterious effects.
Book Chapter
The good, the bad, and the ugly of perspective taking in groups
Research on Managing Groups and Teams
Eugene M. Caruso, Nicholas Epley, Max H. Bazerman
2006
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Citation
Caruso, E.M., Epley, N., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). The good, the bad, and the ugly of perspective taking in groups. In E.A., Mannix, M.A. Neale (Series Eds.) and A.E. Tenbrunsel (Vol. Ed.). Research on Managing Groups and Teams: Ethics and Groups: Vol. 8. Ethics in Groups (pp. 201-224). London: Elsevier.
Abstract
Group members often reason egocentrically, both when allocating responsibility for collective endeavors and when assessing the fairness of group outcomes. These self-centered judgments are reduced when participants consider their other group members individually or actively adopt their perspectives. However, reducing an egocentric focus through perspective taking may also invoke cynical theories about how others will behave, particularly in competitive contexts. Expecting more selfish behavior from other group members may result in more self-interested behavior from the perspective takers themselves. This suggests that one common approach to conflict resolution between and within groups can have unfortunate consequences on actual behavior.
Journal Article
Egocentrism over e-mail: Can we communicate as well as we think?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Justin Kruger, Nicholas Epley, Jason Parker, Zhi-Wen Ng
2005
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Citation
Kruger, J., Epley, N., Parker, J., & Ng, Z. (2005). Egocentrism over email: Can we communicate as well as we think? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 925-936.
Abstract
Without the benefit of paralinguistic cues such as gesture, emphasis, and intonation, it can be difficult to convey emotion and tone over electronic mail (e-mail). Five experiments suggest that this limitation is often underappreciated, such that people tend to believe that they can communicate over e-mail more effectively than they actually can. Studies 4 and 5 further suggest that this overconfidence is born of egocentrism, the inherent difficulty of detaching oneself from one's own perspective when evaluating the perspective of someone else. Because e-mail communicators "hear" a statement differently depending on whether they intend to be, say, sarcastic or funny, it can be difficult to appreciate that their electronic audience may not.
Journal Article
Explanations Versus Applications: The Explanatory Power of Valuable Beliefs
Psychological Science
Jesse L. Preston, Nicholas Epley
2005
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Citation
Preston, J., & Epley, N. (2005). Explanations versus applications: The explanatory power of valuable beliefs. Psychological Science,18, 826-832.
Abstract
People hold beliefs that vary not only in their perceived truth, but also in their value to the believer--their meaning, relevance, and importance. We argue that a belief's value is determined, at least in part, by its explanatory power. Highly valuable beliefs are those that can uniquely explain and organize a diverse set of observations. Less valuable beliefs, in contrast, are those that can be explained by other observations, or that explain and organize few observations. The results of three experiments are consistent with these hypotheses. These experiments demonstrate that applying either scientific or religious beliefs to explain other observations increases the perceived value of those beliefs, whereas generating explanations for the existence of beliefs decreases their perceived value. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for people's resistance to explaining their own beliefs, for the perceived value of science and religion, and for culture wars between people holding opposing beliefs.
Journal Article
The Unpacking Effect in Allocations of Responsibility for Group Tasks
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Kenneth Savitsky, Leaf Van Boven, Nicholas Epley, Wayne M. Wight
2005
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Citation
Savitsky, K., Van Boven, L, Epley, N, & Wight, W. (2005). The unpacking effect in responsibility allocations for group tasks. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 447-457.
Abstract
Individuals tend to overestimate their relative contributions to collaborative endeavors. Thus, the sum of group members! estimates of the percentage they each contributed to a joint task typically exceeds the logically allowable 100%. We suggest that this tendency stems partly from individuals! inclination to regard their fellow group members as a collective rather than as individuals, and that leading people to think about their collaborators as individuals should therefore reduce the perceived relative magnitude of their own contributions. Consistent with this thesis, four experiments demonstrate that people!s tendency to claim more than their fair share of the credit for a group task is attenuated when they "unpack" their collaborators, conceptualizing them as separate individuals, rather than as "the rest of the group."
Journal Article
When what you type isn’t what they read: The perseverance of stereotypes and expectancies over e-mail
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Nicholas Epley, Justin Kruger
2005
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Citation
Epley, N., & Kruger, J. (2005). When what you type isn't what they read: The perseverance of stereotypes and expectancies over email. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 414-422.
Abstract
People form impressions of others by communicating with them, but not all modes of communication transmit information with equal fidelity. E-mail, for instance, is an inherently more limited mode of communication than is voice because of its relative lack of paralinguistic and non-verbal cues. The present research investigated the implication of this distinction for the biasing influence of stereotypes and expectancies. Three experiments demonstrated that racial stereotypes and bogus expectancies influence people’s impressions of a target more strongly over e-mail than voice interactions (Studies 1–3). This occurred despite an experimental design that ensured that the word-for-word content was constant across the two mediums. Follow-up analyses revealed that the effect was due, at least in part, to the greater ambiguity of e-mail versus voice communication (Study 3). Although e-mail affords many benefits, the present research suggests that it may also have some unexpected costs.
Journal Article
When Effortful Thinking Influences Judgmental Anchoring: Differential Effects of Forewarning and Incentives on Self-generated and Externally Provided Anchors
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
Nicholas Epley, Thomas Gilovich
2005
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Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2005). When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring: Differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self-generated and externally-provided anchors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 199-212.
Abstract
Two experiments examined the impact of financial incentives and forewarnings on judgmental anchoring effects, or the tendency for judgments of uncertain qualities to be biased in the direction of salient anchor values. Previous research has found no effect of either manipulation on the magnitude of anchoring effects. We argue, however, that anchoring effects are produced by multiple mechanisms—one involving an effortful process of adjustment from “self-generated” anchors, and another involving the biased recruitment of anchor-consistent information from “externally provided” anchors—and that only the former should be influenced by incentives and forewarning. Two studies confirmed these predictions, showing that responses to “self-generated” anchors are influenced by both incentives and forewarnings whereas responses to “externally provided” anchors are not. Discussion focuses on the implications of these effects for debiasing efforts.
